


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MINISTRY DENIES FLORENNES TO BE CRUISE MISSILE SITE

Brussels LE SOIR in French 5 May 82 p 2

[Article by C.L.B.: "Defense Ministry Denies Missiles to be Based at Florennes"]

[Text] For its Monday morning talk show, the RTBF [Belgian French-Language Radio and Television Service] uncovered Karel Van Miert, the SP [Socialist Party (Flemish wing)] chairman, and he, in turn, uncovered missiles at Florennes. According to an afternoon report by the Belgian news agency Belga, Van Miert revealed that "the environs of Florennes Air Base have been chosen as the primary site for the deployment of nuclear missiles in our country. The process of expropriating the necessary land is already under way."

On 6 April 1982, LA NOUVELLE GAZETTE of Charleroi ran the following headline: "Is Land at Florennes Being Expropriated for Missiles?" The newspaper also recalled that in November 1981 it had headlined "Florennes, Missiles or No Missiles?" Hence this news item--with a question mark, and if news it be--is not new.

At the Ministry of Defense (MOD), a spokesman told us: "We have already frequently explained what is really happening. Under the terms of our agreement with NATO, we are improving a line of communication along which supplies and reinforcements can move."

An army in the field needs a logistic support system echeloned in depth, with depots for equipment, ammunition, medical supplies, etc. Most of this construction work will be done inside the air base. Dispersion requirements will, however, necessitate extending some of this work beyond base boundaries in certain places."

The MOD spokesman further explained that such was the tenor of the reply he has given to various officials who have queried on this subject. These officials included Mr Wauty, the burgomaster of Dinant, Roger Delizee, PS [Socialist Party (Walloon wing)] member of Parliament from Dinant, and Mr Ferriere, administrative secretary of the Federation of Professional Farm Associations.

The information we obtained in the Florennes area itself confirmed what we had already known for a long time, namely that:

1. An extension of the base seems to have been planned on that side close to the Dinant-Philippeville highway. This extension reportedly covers some 50 hectares in the area called La Clairiere where, in fact, surveyors and appraisers have been seen working, and for which expropriation notices have already been prepared.

2. For more than 20 years now, there have been plans to straighten the alignment of the Florennes-Corenne highway which is intersected by a military access road.

3. Construction work is planned in the Onhee district, but solely for the purpose of improving the foundation of the Charlemagne Dinant-Philippeville highway mentioned above.

Based on this information, we cannot infer that there is a whole series of construction projects designed to convert the airfield at Florennes into the site chosen for basing the 48 nuclear-tipped missiles scheduled to be deployed in Belgium.

When we asked Karel Van Miert for his comment, he replied: "The Ministry of Defense's denial in no way changes the situation. I have ascertained from several sources that the Florennes base has definitely been approved as the Belgian base on which the cruise missiles are to be deployed. And the Americans required to support these missiles are also to be housed there.

"Furthermore, I can confirm that the expropriation measures now being taken are unquestionably related to the installation of those nuclear weapons."

The Ministry of Defense then referred us to Minister Vreven's remarks at his 31 March press conference. In summary, Vreven had said: "We are still at the planning stage. This will eventually be followed by a site survey stage and then the adjudications. Completion of anyone of these stages in the missile basing process does not necessarily mean moving on to the next stage."

But, on a par with these subtleties, the MOD covers itself for the future by quoting from Prime Minister Wilfried Martens' governmental declaration of 18 December 1981.

In substance, Martens had said: "The Martens-Gol government will do nothing other than what was approved for Belgium on 19 September 1980 by the third Martens government."

It will be recalled that the government at the time--which included socialists--had decided to await results of the American-Soviet negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons. And it had declared that should these negotiations fail, it would make the decision agreed upon with its allies.

Today, the prime minister's office emphasizes that the fifth Martens government has also assumed the commitment to review every 6 months, together with its allies, the current status of these negotiations and draw therefrom, if and as required, the necessary conclusions within the framework of the

Atlantic Alliance. In addition, the December 1981 governmental investiture declaration specifies that Parliament will be kept regularly informed.

On Monday evening, Minister Vreven sharply attacked the Flemish socialists whom he accused of spreading an endless variety of rumors for the past several months.

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MORE DEFENSIVE STRATEGY FOR BUNDESWEHR PROPOSED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 24 May 82 pp80-103

[Unattributed article: "An Army for Attacking"]

[Text] As a consequence of the U.S. arms buildup and the debate on new nuclear missiles for Europe, politicians and military men are calling traditional Bundeswehr thinking into question. Lack of both budget and personnel are making a reevaluation imperative. Purely defense-oriented armed forces could make do with less money and fewer soldiers.

One more time, Hans Apel arranged the particular type of show which, so critics say, is the only thing that still functions properly at the defense ministry.

The setting: the operations center of the defense ministry. The audience: the members of the cabinet joined by the defense experts of the two coalition fractions. The performers: two colonels from the Apel stable.

And on the program was the—strictly secret—slide show war in Europe.

The two officers—one of them representing the Warsaw Pact and the other NATO—played out the consequences of an aggression from the East conducted solely with conventional weapons. The first variant of the 4-hour looking glass war saw the Warsaw Pact armies attacking with only 4 days advance warning. The second version had them attain optimum readiness in 15 days which, however, gave the NATO defenders time to mobilize and take up their positions.

Both scenarios were equally depressing: Given the present forces ratio, the Western alliance would be faced with the decision of committing nuclear weapons in no time at all.

The conclusion one of the participants reached was: "In a conventional war, we would have a lot of problems holding on long enough to gain time for political solutions."

The then government spokesman had quite a different story to tell that same day. In discussing Apel's war scenario, said Kurt Becker at a Bonn press conference in late September of last year, the cabinet "reached the conclusion that the West is capable of defending Europe; that a potential aggressor would face tremendous risks and that this certainty about being able to defend the continent is the best guarantee for safeguarding peace in Europe."

Is it possible that Becker attended an entirely different presentation ? Or perhaps it is just not a contradiction to admit Western inferiority in a conventional situation and at the same time to maintain that the "certainty of being able to defend" is there.

NATO flexible response strategy gives an affirmative answer to this question.

The core concept of this strategy is that the Western alliance does not exclude the use of nuclear weapons at any level of military confrontation—be it that a nuclear attack is responded to in like manner or be it that the alliance itself escalates the conflict, if the aggressor cannot otherwise be stopped. Non-calculability of NATO reaction is the magic formula designed to deter an aggressor.

This 15 year-old doctrine has always been the subject of controversy. But it has never been more violently debated than it is these days when East-West detente and cooperation are in danger of turning into confrontation and a gigantic arms race.

And now, much to Bonn's chagrin, Robert S. McNamara himself, who was U.S. Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968 and one of the authors of the NATO doctrine, has called it into question.

Its co-authors, former national security adviser McGeorge Bundy, former ambassador George Kennan and former SALT negotiator Gerard Smith, know whereof they speak. They were members of that small circle of Americans privy to the secret operational and targeting plans of nuclear weapons and the devastation they would cause.

McNamara and the others are asking NATO to forgo first use of nuclear weapons.

Their reasoning goes this way: "Every serious study and every military exercise during the past 25 years has shown that even the most careful battlefield use of nuclear weapons would lead to enormous loss of civilian life and property. No one should think that there is any guarantee that such use of nuclear weapons would not lead to further and even more destructive exchanges." The cohesion of NATO, in their view, has been preserved thus far only because "such scenarios have been generally ignored."

In the FRG, too, which would be the prime battleground if deterrence failed, the doubters are on the increase.

The disinterested imperturbability the Germans had affected in the face of the mutual threat posed by the two superpowers and by nuclear overkill now appears to be a thing of the past.

Ordinary citizens who had paid no attention to military matters or thought them revolting now speak with assurance of first and second-strike capabilities; of arms buildups and modernization; of SS-20's and cruise missiles; of neutron weapons and megatonnage. And in mass demonstrations, they call for a halt to the insane arms race.

In the meantime, under the pressure of public opinion, politicians and military men are also discussing the questions that had been obscured for years by the pat slogans regarding alliance solidarity and the common destiny of the West.

All of a sudden, even the CDU/CSU whose fidelity to NATO is normally surpassed by none is engaging in heretical talk.

CDU Chairman Kurt Biedenkopf, for example, is publicly voicing doubt about the possibility of maintaining the consensus regarding Western nuclear strategy. "The concept of global nuclear deterrence subsumes the destruction of everything we are planning to defend," he argues. "The vast majority of people simply cannot live with this dichotomy."

Biedenkopf was criticized by the CDU presidium for making this statement—not because it is incorrect but because it has an unsettling effect on the CDU rank-and-file. Now that is not really out of place because SPD statements on the same subject are remarkably similar.

SPD disarmament expert Egon Bahr, for instance, calls the "deterrence idea" no more than a "transitional theory" in that it contains a dangerous "inner contradiction."

"It tries to combine the avoidance of war with the possibility of waging war," Bahr says, "just in case war cannot be avoided."

SPD chairman Willy Brandt is not content to restrict himself to criticizing nuclear strategy. He is already giving thought to how the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe can be solved "altogether." The answer he has come up with is: "The chances of successfully meeting the conventional superiority of a potential aggressor by resorting to intelligent defense systems are getting better."

The SPD party congress in Munich decided to adopt this view. The delegates agreed almost unanimously to the creation of a commission of the SPD presidium to look into NATO strategy with a view to making the use of nuclear weapons unnecessary. In addition, the Bundeswehr is to be restricted to a purely defensive weapons arsenal.

For now, this sounds futuristic; but it does go to the heart of the matter. The truth is that the conventional component of Western deterrence strategy is no less contradictory than the nuclear component. What point is there, not only Brandt is asking, in conventional armaments which are getting ever more costly and complicated, if all they are good for in case of war is to delay the nuclear holocaust by a few days.

In view of this, the stereotyped statements by German defense ministers according to which the Bundeswehr is "among the best-trained and best-equipped armies in the world," as Apel has said, offer little solace. A Bundeswehr which always quickly lays down its arms in the war games being played by the defense ministry strategists must ask itself whether it might not conceivably be the wrong type of army.

But the Bonn government is taking a long time getting the debate concerning alternative defense strategies and weapons started. It seems as though the halfhearted attempts to think through questions of quality instead of quantity are also falling victim to the momentum of the American arms buildup.

For that matter, President Reagan's idee fixe of attaining at least equal strength with the Soviets in all military fields and thus to close every conceivable "window of vulnerability" is by no means universally accepted in the United States. Maxwell Taylor, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and one of the originators of "flexible response," considers Reagan's strategic missile program to be far too extensive.

A well-protected deterrent force aimed at the economic and military centers of the Soviet Union, so Taylor says, could make do with "substantially fewer weapons than are now available to us." The size and number of missiles should "not be determined by what the Russians have" but solely by the objective of "being able to inflict losses on the Soviets equal to or larger than in World War II."

"With an arsenal of such deadly deterrent capability, it would be insane," Taylor says, "to engage in a further race with the Soviets about the number of missiles." The funds saved could instead be used to increase conventional armaments.

But this job has been assigned primarily to the Europeans by the Reagan administration which simply cannot do without newer and newer weapons. Ever since the President put forward the greatest arms program in peacetime with annual rates of increase of more than 10 percent, the pressure is constantly mounting—particularly on Bonn—to follow suit and to help right NATO's conventional imbalance in Europe. But how?

The German participants in an international military affairs conference in mid-February in Munich tried in vain to find out from U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger what the strategy behind the huge American arms buildup was; how the alliance was expected to share the burden and how much it would have to spend for arms to satisfy the American government. But Weinberger did not go beyond generalities.

Aside from his demands for "more and more" in conjunction with the threat of a U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe in case the demands are not met nothing of a constructive nature is to be expected from Weinberger for the time being.

As for General Bernard Rogers, American CINCEUR, he said there was "no question about" a 4-percent instead of a 3-percent inflation-adjusted increase in the arms budget.

But there are two factors which make it impossible for the FRG to meet the demands for more and more. Not only are there no funds for a new generation of aircraft, tanks and ships that would now have to be put on the drawing board. There aren't any soldiers who might operate them, either.

The defense budget, Hans Apel has told his generals, is spoken for until 1985. All available funds are needed for the prestige equipment already on order such as the Tornado bomber, the Leopard 2 tank and the F 122 frigate. Plans for the coming decade must be shelved. "There is no way the present trend of more and more and better and better can continue," Apel says.

Starting in 1984, the Bundeswehr will be short thousands of conscripts, if existing selective service criteria continue to operate. The age groups born in 1967 and thereafter are so small in number due to the impact of the pill that the present minimum callup figure of 200,000 recruits will no longer be met by 1987.

The generals thus far have come up only with conventional solutions to this problem—extending the term of service from 15 to 18 months; calling up the children of guest workers and instituting voluntary service by women—all of which have run into stiff opposition on the part both of the coalition and the opposition.

But cutting the size of the Bundeswehr is still viewed as taboo by most military men and politicians ranging from Apel himself all the way to the CDU defense expert Manfred Woerner.

Still, there is no treaty anywhere that sets peacetime strength at 495,000 men. The half-million figure is merely cited as a demand in NATO document MC 55/1 and as such could be subjected to review in negotiations with the partners in the alliance.

But true to the Olympic motto of "faster, higher, farther," the military has gotten used to the idea of having a large reservoir of personnel and technology and of arms and equipment at its beck and call. Now they have to pay the penalty for the hefty rates of increase in the early seventies.

Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt signed an executive order permitting his arms planners to budget at least 1.5 percent more money in real terms each year for new weapons and equipment. His successor, Georg Leber, placed on order just about anything he could think of and sometimes even more—all of it with the approval of parliament.

"They did their planning without thinking and screwed things up," Apel said to members of the SPD. For years, there was only talk of new tanks and aircraft and ships; but nobody counted up what else it would take: more fuel, new types of ammunition, larger service facilities and spare parts inventories. And now," Apel said, "I must do the striking off instead of stroking."

From the start, the military establishment was too big for its britches. The Bundeswehr was supposed to be able to do everything and under the circumstances was given too many weapons that were too complicated. "The number of units to be held in readiness is too large," said the then chief of staff Ulrich de Maizi re in a 1979 report for the defense ministry.

As Johann Graf von Kielmannsegg, the former NATO commander for Central Europe, had done 7 years earlier, de Maizi re came out for stronger Bundeswehr cadres—permanent units made up of officers and non-commissioned officers that would be brought up to combat strength in times of crisis only through the addition of reservists.

But the active military men are still against it even though there is a shortage of 20,000 non-commissioned officers—mostly of technical specialists—by this time. By the middle of this decade when the Leopard 2 will be operational and the number of conscripts will have gone down, the army alone will have to drive, service and repair 4,837 battle tanks as well as 3,432 armored personnel carriers, tank destroyers, armored reconnaissance vehicles and anti-aircraft tanks in addition to tens of thousands of cross country trucks and passenger vehicles. Even today, about one-third of all Bundeswehr vehicles are just standing around because of a shortage of spare parts or mechanics.

The causes of this dilemma go back a long way. In terms of organization and structure, the Bundeswehr has remained the same army that was conceived at Himmerod monastery in the Eifel 5 years after the total defeat of Germany by 10 generals and admirals and five general staff officers of Hitler's Wehrmacht against a honorarium of DM 4,500. To explain their defeat in the war, these military men came up with the same line of reasoning that had been used for centuries: too few soldiers and too few weapons.

The memorandum they prepared came out accordingly. Their main argument was that "hostilities" would have to be "carried forward into East German territory as soon as possible." For another thing, "wherever possible, defense must be conducted offensively. This means we must attack everywhere, from the start."

The German contribution to the West European armed forces was therefore envisioned as consisting of 12 armored divisions (with 3,600 tanks), of fighter and combat aircraft (821 planes) and a small navy (of 36 speedboats and 24 submarines). The Soviets would have to be shown the "mailed fist," the Hitler generals accustomed to armored warfare and offensive thinking demanded. Most of the memorandum's authors—as for example Adolf Heusinger and Hans Speidel—donned their uniform again 10 years after Germany's defeat and set about building up the Bundeswehr.

Juergen Brandt, the present chief of staff and Lieutenant General Wolfgang Altenburg, his presumptive successor, are not prepared to admit that the Bundeswehr of 1981 still resembles the army conceived at Himmerod; but their arguments are not very convincing.

The term "forward" defense was replaced by "up front" defense and the motorized tailor and cobbler shops and laundries which were to supply the German soldier with clean clothes and new soles for his boots on the next Eastern campaign were discontinued at the end of the sixties. "That really looked like we were headed for the Pripet Marshes all over again," says Altenburg.

Nonetheless, what armored general Franz Uhle-Wettler said still applies. The Himmerod offensive concept simply did not include the "corresponding structural features. From 1955 until today, we have been developing an army best suited for wide-ranging offensive operations in open terrain while it is actually charged with conducting (up front) defense operations in the Central European area."

Almost item by item, NATO confronts the Warsaw Pact whose strategy is also based on offensive defense with similar weapons—tanks against tanks; cannon against cannon; aircraft against aircraft.

Western equipment may be higher quality but the Eastern armies have a numerical superiority. But the military men and strategists tend to evade the question of how the conventional weapons ratio might be improved in view of the shortage of funds.

Generals of the older generation come up with ideas that are beside the point at best. Hans Poeppel, the army chief of staff who retired at the end of September for example, in talking about the sophisticated battle tank Leopard 2 likes to think back to the uncomplicated effectiveness of the Russian World War II T 34's. "I would be happier with a next-generation Leo that was a bit simpler," Poeppel said.

But it just has to be a tank, no matter what. The 1979 defense white book, for instance, makes no bones about it: "The most effective defense against tanks is a battle tank."

Panzer general Guderian sends his best regards to one and all.

The list of wishes for the nineties submitted by the service branches is just as unimaginative. The army is asking for no less than 8,000 armored vehicles—above all for armored personnel carriers and rocket-equipped tank destroyers. The navy would like to have its seventh and eighth frigate with a present price tag of about DM 500 million each on it in addition to a new submarine and attack helicopter fleet.

The air force is looking for 120 new reconnaissance planes and dreaming of 200-300 fighters. The desire for more and more new aircraft is based to some extent on the decision to build the Tornado, the superbird which by now has cost DM 100 million. This low-flying aircraft will need a fighter escort because it will soon be vulnerable from the air.

It is an endless chain of armaments to which Apel by now is resigned. "As defense minister, I have learned," he says, "that there will always be tanks and aircraft and ships."

The minister will have to do some rethinking. The Munich party congress not only called for a defensive strategy for the Bundeswehr; it also reflected the desire of the party not to have defense budgets grow exponentially but to be adjusted to the overall rate of inflation.

The long-term commission appointed by the minister which is to prepare plans for the nineties by this summer has not come up with anything original on this subject although the experts have long since been involved in a debate which has called into question or has upset concepts of weaponry as well as obsolete operational defense plans.

The central question being discussed is why the Bundeswehr—if it exists for solely defensive purposes—should be equipped with weapons far better suited to wide-ranging offensive operations.

The radical alternative of getting away from up-front defense and embracing the concept of a purely defensive army has been proposed by three men thus far—by the Austrian panzer general Emil Spannocchi; by Guy Brossolet, a French major and by the German peace research scientist, Horst Afheldt.

The takeoff point of all three was much the same. "First of all, it is a historical fact which has not necessarily been discovered in this atomic age," Spannocchi has said, "that it is always the...weak who lose in a military confrontation with a stronger opponent in short order, if they go into combat following the same maxims but with a lesser potential or, one might say, with smaller, true-to-scale forces." This is another way of saying that the weak "permit the stronger adversary to impose their rules of the game on them."

The title of Brossolet's study is emblematic for the conclusions to be drawn from this set of circumstances. It is called: "An Essay Concerning the Non-Battle."

The point is that the superior aggressor is not permitted to play out his strength. The defender avoids unequal exchanges which would make him a quick loser in one or more battles. Instead of following classical rules and taking up positions in the border area, the defending forces split up into small groups and units throughout the country. They fight, Spannocchi says, "according to the maxim both of wearing down the attacker in an endless series of small engagements and of ensuring their own survival."

In his alternative defense model for the FRG, Afheldt starts out from the assumption that every security policy which permits itself to get caught up in an arms race "is a long-term danger to peace." That is why the FRG must try to get NATO "to adopt a defense strategy which permits the alliance to divorce the nature and size of its own arms efforts as far as possible from those of the other side"—the point being that it should not destroy "what it is charged with preserving, namely our social and economic structure."

But this is exactly what worries Afheldt about the existing forward defense strategy. The agglomerations of heavily armored units, the military airfields, the logistic infrastructure reaching far into the hinterland, the nuclear power plants, atomic depots and missile emplacements—all these, he says, present "a monumental picture of major military targets which make the devastation of the FRG an almost foregone conclusion" in case of war.

Just how hard it is for German strategists to deal with unconventional ideas became apparent late last year when General Altenburg and the peace researcher engaged in a debate. "Mr Afheldt," the general began, "let me tell you one thing first off. We have so many problems with our strategy ourselves that we simply cannot afford to discuss models such as you have in mind seriously."

"I am afraid you are turning large parts of the FRG into a combat zone," Afheldt said. Altenburg did agree on some points. There is an attempt being made, he said, of offering fewer worthwhile targets by "loosening things up as much as possible. We are trying to do just that." He then added: "There is some rethinking right now on the subject of concentrating on anti-tank defense rather than on armor as heretofore."

At the end, he even complimented Afheldt by saying: "There are so many elements in your plan that are worth discussing that we should actually get down to them at the expert level."

Apel's predecessor, Leber, on the other hand, had still poked fun at the model with malice aforethought. "I cannot see myself putting an infantryman behind every German oaktree," he had said.

McNamara and the others drew conclusions similar to Afheldt's. The West, they said, is inclined to underestimate its own strength and to exaggerate that of the East. "The development of precision-guided missiles on the technical side and the visible weakening of Warsaw Pact military solidarity are but two examples for changes which work to the advantage of the Western alliance."

There are more serious objections to Afheldt's ideas and those of others who believe in area defense like retired general Hans-Joachim Loeser. The scant depth of the FRG—with an average East-West spread of 250 kilometers—does not permit of attrition strategy. In order to function halfway properly in wartime, the guerilla-like operational principle of commandoes would require

a militarization of the civilian population already in peacetime. The techno-units are vulnerable to area fire and cannot defend themselves against concentrated attacks of separate march columns.

One defense ministry officer puts it this way: "Once the Russians reach the Rhine in three or four wedge formations, it's all over."

Afheldt himself admits that his autonomous techno-commandoes would not succeed in "throwing the Warsaw Pact units decimated during their advance out of the country."

This particular job would be reserved for the American nuclear forces. The threat to use and, if necessary, the actual use of nuclear weapons against selected military and economic targets in East Europe would be designed to force the Soviet Union to restore the status quo.

But just where the atomic threshold lies is in doubt. It is unclear how the defenders might bring about a cessation of hostilities so as to enter into negotiations /prior/ to the use of nuclear weapons.

The fact that Afheldt's techno-network can be breached militarily and thus does not represent "a reliable deterrent" is "a strong argument against it" in the eyes of peace researcher Carl-Friedrich von Weizsaecker who, however, is equally convinced "that the same applies to existing NATO defense strategy."

The Flexible Response strategy, set down in NATO document 14/3 in 1967, goes on the assumption that the defense against an attack would commence right at the border. This should help prevent "battles of long duration on the territory of the FRG."

If the attack cannot be halted near the border by conventional means, then nuclear weapons would have to be used, the planners say—"as late as possible but as early as necessary," as Bonn's 1975 defense white book put it ambiguously.

The escalation scale conceived in dozens of map exercises by NATO military men initially calls for "demonstrative warning shots" of which U.S. Secretary of State Haig was speaking last November and of which Defense Secretary Weinberger professed to know nothing. These warning shots are to call the adversary's attention to the danger of a nuclear war in case he does not withdraw.

The second stage calls for the use of short-range and medium-range nuclear weapons against selected military targets in the GDR, in Poland, Czechoslovakia and, most recently, also in the western parts of the Soviet Union.

The "European High Priority List" at SACEUR includes 2,500 targets: tank concentrations, supply depots, airfields, missile sites, headquarters and rail junctions—above all those located on Poland's eastern frontier where supply trains must change over from the Russian broad-gauge tracks to the European narrow gauge.

Even if all these targets are "covered," as the military jargon has it, another 3,500 nuclear warheads remain in the European NATO depots to be used as the alliance sees fit. The majority of these would probably be used on the territory of the FRG where U.S. nuclear artillery has already pinpointed its "kill zones."

The last stage in escalation is nuclear holocaust—the use of strategic ICBM's against military and industrial targets inside the Soviet Union. In the language of the military it is simply referred to as GNR—General Nuclear Response.

In theory, this strategy makes sense; but what purpose would be served by a Soviet attack limited in time or scope ?

Politically, Moscow could make life much more difficult for the West by resorting to pinpricks against West Berlin or to provocations on NATO's northern or southern flank than by a "surprise occupation of the Wolfsburg tip" which the limited war scenarios of the strategists have called for time and again.

Militarily, it makes no sense at all to mount an attack in Central Europe where the West is strongest after all is said and done.

If the Soviets were to mount a conventional attack, they would have to concentrate such large troop formations that NATO would be forewarned at once—through satellites, aircraft and electronic surveillance. The main buildup area, the GDR, is not a sealed-off country. Tens of thousands of FRG citizens pass through the GDR every day as visitors, using the transit routes and flying to Berlin via the air corridors.

The NATO standard formula according to which the West must have troops ready at all times to protect against an "instant" Soviet surprise move does not gain in accuracy by constant repetition.

Just how careful Moscow is about mounting military operations is shown by the Czech example. In 1968, the Soviets assembled 29 divisions with 490,000 men to oppose a Czech force of 10 divisions with 150,000 men even though they were completely familiar with the Czech command structure, weaponry and equipment.

To be sure, the Warsaw Pact countries are numerically superior in soldiers, tanks, guns and aircraft but by no means to the extent claimed by NATO pessimists from Brussels at regular intervals. The standard military formula calls for the attacker to possess at least a 3:1 edge, if he wants to succeed—and that edge just does not exist in all respects.

In addition to that, there would be a latent, lingering civil war being waged in Poland and Czechoslovakia the outcome of which could not be predicted. Every other conventional soldier in the Warsaw Pact armies would be a Pole or a Czech. That they could be relied on is doubted even by those G-2 officers at the Bonn defense ministry who are responsible for the "enemy situation." At least one-third of the Soviet armed forces, they think, would have to assume police and security functions in case of war.

"Balance is not only a matter of quantity, but of quality as well and that is hard to assess," says former chief of staff de Maizière.

But even if the Soviets should take the fateful step for whatever reason, it will certainly not be possible to impress them with "demonstrative warning shots." It is more likely then that the Soviet leadership, in order to anticipate a NATO nuclear first strike, would try to mount a large-scale nuclear attack to destroy the three dozen airfields and missile sites and the 100 so-called special ammunition depots located on FRG soil.

In such a case the Soviets might still harbor the faint hope that the all-out U.S.-Soviet nuclear war might not take place. President Reagan recently held out this very possibility. "I could imagine a battlefield exchange with tactical nuclear weapons without it causing one or the other superpower to press the button," he said.

Even during the seventies, the Flexible Response strategy had begun turning into a strategy of flexible interpretation. American and European interests are no longer identical.

The Europeans—with the Germans leading the way—are holding on to the fiction that flexible response is practically synonymous to deterrence. It prevents war by making it plain to the Soviet leadership that it would run the risk of total destruction of its own country in case it mounted an attack against Western Europe—so the argument goes.

Bundeswehr soldiers have been saying for years that "if deterrence fails, then we have not done our job well. Then we take off our uniform and go home."

It has been a long time since the Americans thought the strategy credible. They are not only thinking in terms of preventing conflicts but more and more in terms of mastering them politically or, as in the case of the Persian Gulf, militarily. And if war—instead of being unconditionally prevented—is thought through, then it must also be won of course.

As early as 1979, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger issued a strong warning to West Europeans against basing their security solely on the readiness of his President to extinguish civilization. And 6 years earlier than that, in 1973, he had called on the West Europeans to state their conception of a realistic strategy aimed at defending the old continent.

"Should we plan on being able to wage conventional war for a protracted period of time? If so, what should our aims be," Kissinger asked. And if this is not possible, "when, how and to what end should we employ tactical nuclear weapons?"

Kissinger did not get an answer. The Europeans—most of all the German politicians and military men—sidestepped the debate on strategy, for good reason.

"The threat to commit suicide in case one is attacked is not terribly convincing," was the way SPD fraction chief Fritz Erler had put it as early as 1965. A few years later, Helmut Schmidt reached much the same conclusion. The FRG, he said, could only be defended "at the risk of total destruction."

Both American options—that of waging a protracted conventional war or that of engaging in a brief nuclear exchange—are unacceptable for the Germans. In their computer games, Bundeswehr planners have found that a 20-day conventional war or a 5-day nuclear holocaust would both lead to the total destruction of the FRG.

Nonetheless, NATO military men are continuing to play their games in the same old way with the approval of the politicians—so as to justify their demands for bigger and better weapons.

When their forward positions are overrun in the course of a NATO exercise, division commanders invariably call for a nuclear strike.

Between the time of request and the time of release of nuclear weapons by the American President there is an interval of at least 24 hours. As a rule, therefore, the call for nuclear weapons is made very early on—"too early," as retired general Gerd Schmueckler knows only too well from his tenure as Deputy CINCEUR at NATO.

His fellow soldier Johannes Steinhoff, who chaired the NATO military committee from 1970 to 1974, complained to DER SPIEGEL years ago that it was "very hard to convince the military of the fact that nuclear weapons are not a substitute for conventional artillery. We have gotten used to the war pictures where a lieutenant jumps out of the trench after a nuclear bombardment, brushes the dirt off his coat and leads his men on an attack."

Reagan's predecessors, Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, saw things much the same way. They urged the Europeans to familiarize themselves with the idea of a 90-day conventional war and Carter gave the assurance that he would "use nuclear weapons only in case of a threat to the security and existence of my own country."

But for lack of funds the consequences—which are to strengthen conventional capability—could not and cannot be drawn. NATO may have tens of thousands of tanks and guns but not enough ammunition.

In case of war, the Bundeswehr would have no ammunition left after 20 days and the U.S. army would have none after 30. And the reinforcements for Europe held in readiness in the United States would probably come too late.

This, too, creates pressure for crossing the threshold to a nuclear strike early or too early. Beyond that, the new generation of nuclear weapons lowers the threshold even further. Cruise missiles and neutron bombs do not cause massive destruction; they can be used selectively. The effect is devastating but it can be limited. Their use becomes even more likely under the circumstances.

For this reason, the Bonn government can no longer cling to the illusion that the American President can be counted on to make the right decision for Europe at the right moment.

As long as the NATO strategy remains in force, he has the power of life and death over the Europeans. He alone can decide on the use of all nuclear weapons; he does not even have to ask his allies before giving the deadly order to "fire when ready." Egon Bahr has said: "Not we but others make the decisions affecting our very existence."

Secretary of State Haig, while still NATO commander in Europe, characterized the American position as follows: "The essence of our strategy lies in its incalculability."

This particular definition runs counter to European and particularly to German security interests. Political-military incalculability from the American viewpoint is tantamount to physical-material risk for the Europeans.

As NATO was working out the modernization part of its two-track resolution in 1979, the then U.S. supreme commander in Europe Alexander Haig called for countering the Soviet SS-20's with no less than 1,800 Western medium-range missile systems. The Europeans and most of all the Germans were shocked. This type of buildup, based on purely /military/ criteria would force the Russians to add further to their arsenal. The point was, they said, to preserve the /political/ character of nuclear weapons.

Western modernization in Europe would therefore have to be limited so that the connection to the strategic American intercontinental weapons was not lost. At the same time, they added, it would have to be massive enough to be taken seriously by Moscow and thus to become a bargaining chip.

At the end of lengthy debate it was agreed to position those 108 Pershing 2 and the 464 cruise missiles in Western Europe unless agreement was reached on the limitation or removal of the medium-range missiles.

But if priority is assigned to the political aspect of deterrence, why is the nuclear umbrella being unraveled into separate components ? Why is the attempt being made to figure out a military balance for ICBM's and medium-range missiles, for aircraft and submarines, if in fact the two sides ought to be looking for ways to avoid all types of military conflict ?

It might be enough, as Guenter Gaus, the new adviser to the SPD presidium has said, to have the "biggest, most powerful American stick," namely total retaliation, in the arsenal.

As regularly as simulated war games tend to lead to a rapid collapse of a conventional NATO defense of Europe, map exercises which include all military and political data invariably come out in a way which German military writer K. Peter Stratmann has summarized as follows: "The Soviet side apparently does not assume...that it will be able to bring its military might into play

in Central Europe and control the risk factor. On the contrary; it is to be assumed that the Soviets...have a great political interest in preventing the outbreak of an armed conflict in this area."

On the other hand, Stratmann says, NATO deterrent strategy is based "primarily on military options and a variety of escalation constraints which tend to trigger serious self-deterrent reflexes on the part of the West."

For this reason he calls for strengthening conventional defense capability in order to "reduce dependence on the threat of using nuclear weapons as much as possible."

There is more than enough of critique all around; but there are few ideas on how to improve things.

General Uhle-Wettler, for instance, is critical of the total mechanization and "hyper-technization" which has "led the army into a blind alley." It has done so in terms of tactics, since such units are unsuited for operations in about "half the German terrain" such as villages, towns, industrial areas, wooded areas and highlands; in terms of logistics, "since the huge supply organizations feed off the combat units, can no longer be afforded protection and are themselves too vulnerable;" in budgetary terms "because combat troops are so expensive that we can only field part of the necessary divisions and cannot even supply these with sufficient materiel;" in political terms "because the necessity for early mobilization places constraints on the freedom of action of the political leadership," and in terms of strategy "because it is very doubtful that the army will ever have the absolutely necessary preparation time to effect general mobilization."

General Altenburg who says his colleague is "absolutely right" in principle is calling for a defense establishment for the future which "makes use of human beings as sparingly as possible, if it does not substitute for them altogether."

Weapons technology points in this direction. There must not and there will not be tanks, airplanes and ships forever and ever regardless of what Hans Apel has to say on the subject.

Physicist and Nobel laureate Hans Bethe says: "One day, tanks are going to be as superfluous as the cavalry is today."

"In view of the latest developments in intelligent weapons," American arms specialist Paul F. Walker has come to the conclusion that precision-guided systems "will be able sooner or later to overcome most, if not all, defenses and will dominate the combat scene of the future." In an area as "heavily armed as Central Europe," he says, "that side" will be "most vulnerable which attacks first and thereby gives away its position."

In other words, the defender would be at an advantage and there would be a military stalemate.

And a stalemate—as the efforts of the superpowers to reach agreement on limiting strategic weapons have shown—appears to be a minimum condition for arms control. The more pronounced the defensive capability of NATO is, the less sense it would make for the Warsaw Pact to mount a massive attack. This might thus give the long stagnant MBFR negotiations a new lease on life.

In addition, the "thinking" defense weapons of the future would be less costly than recurrent development cycles for new generations of Leopards and Tornados; at the very least they would be cheaper to maintain. A Leopard 2, which costs almost DM 4 million, requires twice that much for maintenance during its 20-year peacetime life cycle. That is a rule of thumb for conventional heavy equipment.

But if the military will not let go of their traditional playthings, the politicians will be on the spot. If Hans Apel really wants to effect a change, he could refer back to a piece of advice given by Lord Salisbury more than 100 years ago to the Earl of Lytton, the then governor-general of India, which Chief of Staff Juergen Brandt is in the habit of quoting. "You are listening to the soldiers too much," Lord Salisbury said. "One should never trust the experts. To believe the physicians, nothing is healthy. To believe the theologians, nothing is innocent. To believe the soldiers, nothing is safe."

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ROLE OF DEFENSE IN AGRICULTURE TO ENSURE SURVIVAL DESCRIBED

Paris DEFENSE in French No 24, Mar 82 pp 27-31

[Summary of reports done by the working committees of national and regional associations]

[Text] Agriculture and Defense

This topic, studied in 1980-1981, has resulted in 11 reports prepared by working committees of the national association and of the regional associations--Lille, Amiens, Beauvais, Laon, Metz, Paris, Brest, Rennes, Nantes and Toulon. The study that follows has been prepared on the basis of these reports, but also with the aid of the valuable summary note drawn up by the IHEDN [Institute for High National Defense Studies] for the conclusions session.

We shall cite as few figures as possible in this study; they are collected in a documentation note appended.

"It is uncommon to associate agriculture and defense in the same line of thinking. Usually, the only mission assigned to agriculture...is to provide food for the civilian population and the armed forces.

"Nevertheless it seems useful to us to get away from this sole and obvious concept and consider the real place of agriculture in the overall defense of France, by itself or as an integral part of the Europe of the Ten...."
(Amiens)

"One of the objects of defense, as it is defined by the ordinance of 7 January 1959, is to ensure the life of the population at all times, in all circumstances and against all forms of aggression.... It is obvious that agriculture will have a decisive role to play.... It is also necessary for it to be capable of coping with the conditions that could result from crises and conflicts." (Rennes)

Now "in the era of uncertainty into which the world has entered, the agroalimentary sector remains one of the best opportunities for France, which is the No 1 European producer and exporter of agricultural products." (AA [expansion unknown])

"As an essential component of defense, agriculture should orient its efforts in the direction of development of self-sufficiency in its essential products and increase its export capacities to the maximum." (Beauvais)

"The embargo on cereal exports to the USSR ordered by President Carter on 4 January 1980 posed the question of the food weapon with new acuity. The ending of the embargo decided on by President Reagan on 24 April 1981 has not reduced the advisability of deeper reflection on this question." (AA)

As 1982 begins, this problem is at the heart of international concerns, in the setting of the Polish tragedy, both as regards the differences over food aid to Poland and as regards the economic sanctions against the USSR decided on by President Reagan.¹

The principal questions having been posed, the associations have carried out:

- on the one hand, an examination of the defense situation in the agricultural-policy area;
- on the other hand, an inventory of the threats;
- and finally, reflections on the possible evolution of the situation, and proposals for supporting the national defense effort.

They have devoted important chapters of their studies to the food weapon and to green power--their possibilities and conditions of use, their effectiveness.

The Current Situation

"France has always been an agricultural country, and the French remain attached to their land. It produces well for them, providing a superabundance of food today with 10 percent of the national labor force." (Paris)

"Our agriculture has some strong points, but also some weaknesses and vulnerabilities." (Rennes-Metz)

Its evolution essentially takes the form of generalized mechanization, concentration of the firms, and often, specialization of them, with a correlatively large increase in yield, despite a sizable decrease of the labor force; and furthermore, "a considerable expansion of the processing and transformation of the products of the land." (Paris)

Thus the transformation industries, previously not very important, "have changed into a veritable agro-alimentary fabric covering the whole of the country" (Rennes) "and transforming 60 percent of the production" (Paris), "thus representing the No 1 national economic sector" (Amiens).

1. After all, aren't the unbridled demands of the oil-producing countries a powerful "alimentary" or economic weapon used shamelessly to subjugate the consumer countries--that is, the rest of the world--in various ways?

At the same time, scientific progress has permitted the rapid development of research on agricultural products, but also on the possibilities of new energy sources within our reach.

Our agriculture has therefore become an extremely powerful tool enabling France to be, on the world level, "the No 2 exporter of dairy products, the No 3 exporter of cereals, the No 4 exporter of sugar, the No 5 exporter of meat..., which led President Giscard d'Estaing to say at Vassy in 1977: 'Agriculture should be our oil'." (AA)

But this flattering picture should not conceal the weaknesses and vulnerabilities from us.

The most distinct weaknesses may lie in:

- the absence of any world monopoly or market-dominating product (except for fine wines);
- the absence of any solvent country dependent on France, which "is not the exclusive supplier of anyone" (AA);
- the dispersal of the production units, which makes for deficient knowledge of the existing ones, weak self-financing, and aid which is more or less linked to electoral considerations, which is costly for the community and creates tensions.

Growing operating costs and considerable indebtedness result from all this. (Toulon)

Finally, the entire game is now being played within the relatively rigid framework of the EEC. In this regard, one should note here the paradox pointed out by the AA: "The creation of the EEC (which takes more than 60 percent of French exports) has been partly at the origin of the expansion of agriculture and today is impeding the utilization of its potential."

The vulnerabilities, unfortunately, are numerous.

Predominant among them is obviously the formidable and total energy dependence resulting "from general mechanization and from the expansion of the processing and transformation of products." (Paris)

But nearly as serious are:

- our large and growing needs for chemical products, proteins (80-percent imported), farm machinery, means of transport and storage;
- our deficiency in research on protection against massive poisoning of the water and of the harvests.

The Legal Instruments

National defense was organized in an overall way by the ordinance of 7 January 1959; and more particularly:

--a decree of 28 November 1959 that stipulates the measures to be taken by the minister of agriculture in the matters of protection of animals, plants and water;

--by a decree of 31 July 1963, stating again the minister's decisive role in the supplying of the civilian population and the armed forces, in orientation of production in function of defense necessities, in safeguarding of resources against sabotage and destruction, setting-up of reserves, etc.

But "even in peacetime, there seems to be a lack of means and people to provide for these essential measures." (Nantes)

"For lack of credits, the structures planned have to await mobilization in order to be operational; preparation of defense measures as regards replenishment of stores is often taken care of by the departmental defense offices," which have many other tasks to perform. (Lille)

In short, "the laws are not applied; furthermore, they are incapable of being applied, for lack of means and especially because of the attitude of the officials responsible for applying them...."

"The criticism is serious but the association...would like a considerable effort to be made to remedy it." (Pays de Loire)

Agricultural Policy

On the level of the legislation and of current agricultural policy, the associations have cited in particular the orientation law of 4 July 1980, "an objective of which, among others, is greater independence through reduction of the costs of the intermediate production factors and of imported raw materials, and which presents a different vision of the economy, with a nonrigid approach to a defense that is not passive but active." (Nantes)

Emphasis is placed on:

--a policy of education, ongoing training, research and development, with a view to greater autonomy;

--an active export policy;

--improvement of the value added industrially to the products of the soil;

--a policy for saving of energy and raw materials;

--a policy for competition in the production, transformation and distribution activities.

These essential points carry the seeds of a profound modification of agriculture falling within the framework of a conception of national defense that provides itself with the means to react effectively and rapidly in case of crisis or shortage." (Nantes)

The "Maine-Anjou" committee devotes the entirety of its study to this law, and concludes that there is "a certain incoherence, the law being made of contra-

dictions, as if the members of Parliament and the government had wanted to satisfy all the aspirations and demands at the same time....

"This regulatory measure is deficient by its lack of courage vis-a-vis national objectives, defense in particular; no one has dared to say that real political analysis doubtlessly led to proposing either a nationalization of the lands, civil-service status for the farmers, or in the medium term, absolute control of the means of agricultural production."

Furthermore, "there can be no question of profoundly reworking the structures of our agriculture; that would be to jeopardize its combativeness, and therefore our trade balance and the standard of living of our rural society."
(Rennes)

At the same time, the often-quoted director of the INRA [National Institute of Agronomic Research] "urges a new doctrine for an agriculture that is more economical and more autonomous, more extensive and less production-oriented"
(Nantes).²

Threats and Suggestions

The threats range from total war to economic confrontation.

Three types of scenario have been defined:

- open conflict;
- direct or indirect subversive actions;
- strangulation in the form of means of pressure, intimidation or retaliation involving essential supplies.

In case of conflict, production is affected, if not paralyzed, and the feeding of the population and of the armed forces is no longer ensured.

In case of prolonged crisis, "the role of agriculture and its effectiveness are directly a function of transport and of the organization of the distribution networks, whereas in case of acute and short-lived crisis, one would have to be confronted quite rapidly with problems of individual and collective reserve stocks." (Nantes - Paris)

2. From a good source, it appears that the fundamental options of the 1980 law will be modified by the new government; these modifications would involve in particular:

- a revision of the structures, notably by creation or extension of the land offices and product offices;
- an income policy;
- enhanced internal solidarity;
- a taxation system and a social regime that are normalized in relation to those of the other citizens;
- increased support for training and research;
- continuity of the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy).

Finally, "in time of noncrisis, the agro-alimentary domain is a preponderant factor in the country's resistance; national independence is dependent on it, and it opens up interesting possibilities of exchanges." (Beauvais)

In the face of this complex situation and the various threats, a number of concrete proposals have been formulated.

"A voluntarist policy necessitates research and progress in many areas:

- management of agricultural operations on the accounting, financial and technical levels, doubtlessly requiring use of the computer;
- biology and genetics (research on species resistant to diseases, on new better-adapted hybrids, on high-yield species);
- chemistry and biochemistry (exploitation of biomass and agricultural wastes, production of proteins and biofuels, etc);
- mastery of the physical environment." (Beauvais)

Several associations stress that this kind of research is of interest for national defense, by creating new resources and thus enhancing the country's independence, and "certain of them can be used directly, notably in the area of biological and bacteriological defense." (Beauvais - Lille)

The Beauvais association considers "that they could be supplemented by agro-strategic studies relating to:

- the influence of the rural milieu on defense and its organization (great plains, tank courses, wooded areas, irrigation canals, etc);
- the interaction between operations and harvests, especially important in the case of subversive warfare;
- distribution of resources (people and energy in particularly) among the armed forces, war production and agricultural production;
- organization of the indispensable reserve stores in certain less vulnerable regions."

Some in the audience think that "the current policy of patent protection in the agricultural field should be tighter." (Lille)

The numbers of actively employed persons "have decreased considerably in the last 30 years and have reached an incompressible minimum." (Metz - Paris) It is therefore necessary to promote a policy making it possible to retain a sufficient percentage of farmers, and the mobilization measures should concentrate mainly on nonagricultural workers.

A training and information effort aimed at the farmers and the population is called for. The rural milieus and the young people in the agricultural schools should receive broader information on the general situation of agriculture and the results achieved by applied research. "The cooperation between the INRA and the agricultural organizations should be developed." (Metz - Rennes - Lille - Nantes)

The informing of the population should be intensified, and it should be "acquainted with the strengths and weaknesses of the rural classes, for better mutual understanding."

Concrete Measures for Defense

The audience suggested that:

--"under the authority of the departmental director of agriculture, the supply offices should be manned by reservists of the profession and related professions. They would be responsible for studies concerning the supplying of stores, censusing of the needs and the places of storage, the means of distribution." (Amiens)

--the resources needed for an annual national exercise through mobilization of the cadres who have been given a defense assignment be written into the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture. (Paris)

--there be set up "a defense corps, under conditions provided for by the National Service Code, with the mission of organizing and operating the supply circuits in case of crisis." (Lille - Paris)

"It should be possible to pit against subversion and sabotage an antagonist force composed of the farmers themselves, a network of informed and motivated persons, well-imbued with the spirit of defense." (Paris)

Finally, "the working out of ORSEC [Disaster Relief Organization] plans for economic defense" is also proposed, "just as they exist for civil protection, with periodic exercises for testing them." (Laon)

The Common Agricultural Policy

The recognized existence of a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) within the EEC means we no longer have total independence and "tends to weaken the notion of national defense." Very often, "the threat becomes European; the reply to it should therefore be European." The search for better independence of supply as well as better security must necessarily be conducted through reflection by the Ten as a whole."

But in view of the EEC's weakness in the face of green power, "a renovation of the CAP, which should contribute to a world food strategy, is necessary." The deterioration of the developing countries' food deficit and the necessity of ensuring their rural development will constitute one of the greatest challenges of the coming years." (Beauvais - Nantes - Paris - Toulon)

The Food Weapon

Finally, it appears desirable to devote, as the working groups have done, a sizable section of this summary to the question of the "food weapon," on a general plane and on the particular plane of France.

On a General Plane

"The direct food weapon is the use of food as a means of pressure for obtaining political or (and) economic results.

"The indirect food weapon means depriving a country of the means that it has to import (energy, seeds, fertilizers, antiparasite products, etc).

"A third type is poisoning of water or massive destruction of harvests (chemical, bacteriological, entomological, mycological, etc, warfare)." (AA)

"This weapon has been readily used in the past, from sieges of cities starved out in this way to Carter's embargo of February 1980, with Napoleon's continental blockade inbetween.... Doubt has been cast on the effectiveness of Carter's measure: its partisans considered that the invasion of Afghanistan could not be tolerated without a reaction; but certain opponents--a USSR spokesman such as Interagra--considered it a harmless blow and an absurdity, realizing full well that denying the effectiveness of a measure that hurts you is the best way to get the adversary to withdraw it.

"Others, whose interests were compromised--that is, the producers--declared that the embargo had backfired and had become a useless sacrifice.

"This assertion is highly exaggerated: to be sure, the embargo had backfired and the USSR received 'clandestine' American cereals, but via a complicated circuit and other cereals with lengthened time-period [as published], and therefore at higher prices.

"The grounds thus exist for a serious crisis, even if a total shortage is not reached.

"It would be just as absurd to deny the effectiveness of the food weapon because it achieves only a partial success as to wish to get rid of artillery because not all shells hit the target.

"The embargo was lifted without the USSR having retreated a step, but not without having created a disturbance with lasting effects on its economy.³

"It should therefore be asked how one can both give the food weapon maximum effectiveness and reduce its disadvantages as much as possible.

"The food weapon is a weapon; use of it therefore requires evaluation of its costs, disadvantages and effectiveness.

"The food weapon is a strategic weapon with worldwide repercussions. The advisability of its use therefore depends on the adversary's needs, his possibilities of recourse and retaliation, and the disadvantages for oneself and one's allies.

3. As 1982 begins, the Polish tragedy is producing the same reactions--that is, American economic sanctions (for the moment) against the USSR, doubtlessly entailing the grain embargo again. It is interesting, on this point, to note how important and effective appears the use by the USSR of the economic weapon, thus the "other side of the coin" of the food weapon--that is, the supplying by the West of agricultural products and advanced technologies indispensable...to the ongoing and colossal armament effort, with the West thus furnishing the USSR with "the rope with which to hang it," as Lenin himself said.

"The food weapon is an economic weapon, of a character that is continuous and capable of results ranging from deterrence and pressure to coercion.

"The food weapon is aimed at the population, and through it, the armed forces, hurting their morale; it is thus a powerful psychological weapon." (Metz)

In this regard, it is very interesting to note the observation (Metz) that the totalitarian states, lacking media, and indifferent to the discontent of their populations, who are uninformed (and) or "made to toe the line and supervised," are in the last analysis infinitely less vulnerable than the democracies, which are so sensitive to public opinion and to the well-being of their populations.

What is more, the totalitarian countries, applying their Marxist dialectic, turn the adversary's aggression against him through the intermediary of the media, parties and organizations at their disposal.

On the Particular Plane of France

Other working groups concerned themselves more specifically with the notion of the food weapon for France in particular.

We note, among others, the study made in this regard by the Brest association:

--"France could not use the food weapon in an offensive way, for our country does not have the right conditions, possessing neither a monopoly nor mastery of the international circuits, besides which it runs the risk of a retaliation that potentially constitutes a 'deterrent in itself.'

"Furthermore, we would thus deprive ourselves of very important outlets, with the risk of provoking serious internal difficulties.

--"The food weapon therefore constitutes for our country not a means of attack but a threat.

--"Such aggression, by direct embargo, by a drying-up of sources or, indirectly, by unacceptable price policy, has a nonmilitary character of particular gravity, because there is no possible military response."

In the face of this permanent threat, it is consequently necessary "to orient our national production in such a way that it covers the maximum proportion of our needs at all times, to diminish the population's flight from our rural areas by inducements of all sorts, to set up reserve stocks making it possible to improvise a response, to be capable of having available, in case of serious crisis, an effective distribution service."

All this will have to be examined within the framework, both favorable and unfavorable, of our membership in the EEC.

Conclusion

At the conclusion of this study, several themes that call for particular reflection emerge from the audience's reports:

"The role of agriculture in the safeguarding of our country and its capacity for resistance to threats remains very important, and the defense point of view, too often absent, should inspire certain modifications of our agricultural policy." (Lille)

France cannot play an independent role in use of the food weapon, but it can strengthen its influence within the ranks of the agricultural powers by:

- working toward diversification of the sources of supply (AA);
- developing production of sensitive products or the means of production necessary to our independence (proteins, seeds, fertilizers) (AA);
- seeing to it that reserve stocks indispensable to our survival are set up;
- updating the defense plans, with the means necessary for applying them;
- ensuring the training and informing of the agricultural world and of the population.

11267

CSO: 3100/654

EXPERT DISCUSSES DISARMAMENT, ARMS CONTROL, START TALKS

Paris DEFENSE in French No 24, Mar 82 pp 19-25

[Text of speech given on 18 Jan 82 at the Institute for Advanced Defense Studies by Jacques Laureau, Assistant Director for Strategic Affairs and Pacts at the French Foreign Ministry]

[Text] I have been asked to speak to you today on the "diplomatic aspects of the negotiations on Euromissiles."

Please permit me to deviate from this title somewhat, inasmuch as I tend to consider that diplomatic activity cannot be detached from the subject it deals with, and consequently, before taking up the mysteries of the Soviet-American negotiations in progress and describing to you their hopes and limits and certain risks, I would first like to set out for you what the stakes are behind the question of theater nuclear weapons, now called medium-range weapons.

I. What Is the Origin of the Problem?

This is a problem with two sides:

- a technical and military side;
- a political side.

A. The Technical and Military Aspect

a) Flexible Response and Control of Escalation

--Since the adoption by our allies of the doctrine of flexible response (in 1967), the American deterrence as extended to Europe has rested on the possession by the United States, in the nuclear domain (and by NATO as a whole in the conventional domain), of such means that the USSR could not think of choosing to launch into one level of attack or another against the NATO alliance in Europe without exposing its forces to a counterattack at a higher level.

--The credibility of this doctrine therefore rests on the United States' possibility of possessing complete control of the escalation--that is, of using such means that the price that the Soviet Union would pay for going on with its aggression would be too high--the ultimate price being the prospect of a generalized nuclear confrontation with the United States.

--That is why the Americans had deployed in Europe an entire panoply of short-range nuclear battle weapons (about 7,000 warheads) intended to compensate for the Soviet conventional superiority, and certain longer-range weaponry had been placed at the disposal of SACEUR: both the 172 F-111 bombers stationed in Great Britain and 400 Poseidon-type missiles for launching from their SNLE's [Missile-Launching Nuclear Submarines].

b) The combination of the USSR's achieving strategic parity with the United States and its capacity to threaten a preemptive strike against the European theater's means of nuclear retaliation presented Washington with the risk of losing its capacity for control of the escalation process, and consequently of destroying the credibility of flexible response.

--Review of the Origins of "Flexible Response"

At the end of the war at the beginning of the 1960's [as published], the United States had agreed to define quite a laxist concept of the use of nuclear weaponry. In effect, its awareness of having--as regards the carrier vehicles--a unilateral advantage over the USSR, whose territory could be threatened by strikes from American missiles stationed in America (bombers) or on the periphery of Soviet territory, whereas the territory of the United States was not threatened in this way, enabled Washington to brandish the threat of "unilateral and massive punishment" in case of Soviet aggression in Europe. Moscow was thus deterred from trying to exploit its conventional superiority in the European theater. In this situation, the Americans had envisioned a certain decentralization of nuclear "release" decision-making to their operational commands, and even an association of their allies in nuclear fabrication and decision-making.

It fell to the Kennedy administration, at the beginning of the 1960's, to promote a radically different approach: in effect, it appeared to him--as had been presaged by the placing of the Sputnik in orbit in 1957--that the Soviet Union had decided to provide itself with big intercontinental missiles capable of reaching the American "sanctuary." It therefore became imperative for Washington to be in a position to control the Western nuclear panoply completely and to being with Moscow a dialogue viewed as a stabilizing factor, so as to avoid the United States' being engaged, against its will and in an unforeseeable manner, in a destructive confrontation with Moscow. That is why Mr McNamara advised the Atlantic Council, from 1962 on, of the United States' desire to bring about entirely centralized and consequently exclusively American control of the nuclear means: it was necessary to avoid going to extremes, for the protection of Europe, from the very outset--whence the proposal of a "graduated response," starting from a strong conventional defense and going through various stages in nuclear escalation, so that American territory would not be immediately and automatically involved in a European-theater conflict. From this conception, adopted by NATO in 1967, there resulted a complete reorganization of the Western apparatus ("forward conventional defense"), but also an entirely new United States rigidity toward any participation by the allies in nuclear-weapons decision-making or fabrication. We very rapidly became aware of the uncertainties for the defense of Europe that resulted from this; whence our withdrawal from the Integrated Military Organization and the pursuit of our deterrence effort.

--The USSR's achieving of strategic parity only increased these uncertainties:

The American margin of strategic superiority having eroded because of the slow-down of the efforts in the domain of nuclear weapons on account of the Vietnam war, the SALT agreements only called attention to the fact of the USSR's having achieved strategic parity with the United States. By the same token, the credibility of extension of the American deterrence to Europe threatened to be compromised if Washington did not find the means to prevent the USSR from believing that it could menace Europe with a conventional and nuclear attack with impunity since the American central system was now paralyzed. The task was therefore to give the American president the options that would keep him from having only the choice--inhibiting in itself--of not reacting or of immediately committing the American strategic means, thus accepting the risks for the American cities and population. In this regard, the 400 warheads installed in the Poseidon-type SNLE's placed at the disposal of SACEUR at the beginning of the 1970's did not constitute a sufficient option, since use of them, from an American central system and aiming at Soviet cities, would have signified a desire to enter into a generalized war. There remained the 172 FB-111's stationed in Great Britain and carrying two nuclear bombs; but they were impeded by the Soviet air defense. That is why Washington, having become aware of the necessity of restoring an option intermediate between recourse to the American central systems and the short-range nuclear battle weapons, envisioned, from 1975/1976, the deployment in Europe of new medium-range systems capable of hitting the western fringe of the USSR: to deter it, but also--in case of actual use--so as to be capable of destroying the reinforcement infrastructures (the Soviet airports and depots of the western districts).

--The USSR's deployment of the SS-20's only made a solution of this problem more urgent:

In effect, the Soviet Union's deployment, starting in 1977, of the medium-range missile at the rate of more than one a week had the effect of giving it, as of 1982, the possibility of destroying the entire NATO retaliatory apparatus, conventional and nuclear, in a first strike.

The SS-20's are three times more accurate than the 400 SS-4's and SS-5's that they replace. They are fitted with three warheads; their survival is better-assured by a certain mobility; and their range (4,200-5,000 km) enables them to hit any zone of West Europe from positions far-removed from the European front (beyond the Urals) and makes it possible for some of them to be deployed against the European countries and China at the same time. The rate of fabrication of this missile has been very rapid, since it is a derivative--with one stage less--of the SS-16 intercontinental missile prohibited by SALT II. It may be considered--to view the situation from the outside--that there are about 500 elements that are vital to NATO's defense apparatus (communications centers, ports, infrastructures, logistical depots, air bases, launching bases, etc). And to date, the Soviets have already deployed 250 SS-20 missiles, 175 of which--or about 525 warheads--are aimed against NATO.

Added to these are the TU-22-M bombers carrying three nuclear charges (the Backfire), the TU-22's (the Blinder) and the TU-16's (the Badger), the latter

carrying two charges each. It can be considered that as of the time that the ratio of the number of warheads with which the SS-20's and the bombers are equipped to the number of infrastructures vital for NATO's response exceeds 1:2, the Soviet Union has a demonstrated capacity for preemption.

These Soviet deployments are now sufficient to constitute a threat to NATO's response apparatus, so that the Atlantic Alliance's inferiority on the conventional level is no longer systematically compensated for.

B. The Political Problems

They have been the product both of the desire for consultation with the Europeans, of their uneasiness about the consequences of the SALT process for the American guarantee in Europe, and of their concern to see dialogue with the USSR maintained.

a) The Question of Consultation

At the time of the discussion relative to adoption of the "flexible response" concept within NATO, our allies who are members of the Integrated Military Organization, and the West Germans in particular, who were in this way seeking to compensate for their particular status in Europe, attempted to get a concept of joint nuclear decision-making accepted. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, wishing to retain exclusive control of the nuclear escalation process, rejected this, conceding only the creation of a "Nuclear Planning Group" within which the Allies would be consulted on the general orientations. Nevertheless, the argument formerly used by Herr Strauss to obtain consultation of a more far-reaching character was brought up again by the European governments, especially that of Herr Schmidt, on the subject of deployment of theater weapons, the need for which had been raised by Group No 10¹: that is, that the countries that took the risk, vis-a-vis the Soviets, of accepting deployments of new weapons on their territory should be associated very closely in the decision-making on the programs and in the political handling of that matter.

--There was a memorable initial "misfire" with the decision relative to deployment of the neutron bomb (April 1978). Even when Herr Schmidt had with difficulty obtained support within his own party for a positive decision and had announced it, President Carter decided a few days later to put off, unilaterally, the production of that weapon.

--The result was that the American president could only accede to Chancellor Schmidt's desire that the consultation mechanism be improved with regard to theater weaponry, thus placing it at the center of discussion in Europe. It must be said that Herr Schmidt had spared no effort in this regard, as is evidenced by the speech he gave to the IISS [International Institute of Strategic Studies] on 28 October 1977.

b) That speech evidenced the Europeans' uneasiness about the future of the American guarantee in Europe:

1. This was one of the 10 groups assigned by NATO's Defense Plans Committee to prepare recommendations with a view to preparing the Integrated Military Organization's Long-Term Defense Plan.

This uneasiness had to do with the fact that:

--the Democratic administration, while allowing the technical studies on modernization of theater weaponry to be continued,

--accepted, in the protocol appended to SALT II and valid to 31 December 1981, provisions limiting the United States' possibility of deploying the Cruise missiles of more than 600 km range to which the work of the above-mentioned Group No 10 had referred vis-a-vis modernization of the theater forces. Everything led our European allies to fear that this protocol would be automatically extended beyond its expiration date. The Europeans therefore had the feeling that if they let things go, the defense of Europe would be "uncoupled" from that of the United States.

c) Finally, there was posed for the Europeans, in an underlying manner, the question of ensuring their influence in the defining of all the elements--including the military ones--of East-West relations:

The governments concerned considered it advisable to avoid being faced, without their consent, with a choice between maintenance of the achievements of detente in Europe and the deployment of the new weapons. Such a choice would have been especially painful for the FRG, which was interested in the pursuit, without discontinuity, of its relations with the GDR, to which Moscow held the key.

It was also advisable, as regarded public opinion in the various countries, for NATO not to appear to be making a unilateral modernization gesture without prospects of armaments limitation being presented simultaneously.

C. That is why the preparation of the 12 December 1979 decision on modernization was surrounded by a great many precautions:

a) Strengthening of Consultation:

Two new organisms, reporting to the Nuclear Planning Group and to the Defense Plans Committee, were created on the FRG's initiative. They are made up, under American chairmanship, of experts of the member countries of the Integrated Military Organization:

--the High-Level group, assigned to study the technical implications of the modernization effort;

--the Special Consultative Group, assigned to work out a negotiation proposal that the Americans would make to the Soviets within the framework of SALT III.

b) The affirmation of the solidarity of our allies:

--on the one hand, Chancellor Schmidt announced that the FRG would agree to the stationing of new systems on its soil only on the condition that at least one other continental country accepted them;

--on the other hand, within the study of the technical options by the Americans, they rejected the option of sea-based systems (Cruise missiles), obliging their allies to manifest their determination by deployment of land-based Cruise missiles on their territory.

c) Simultaneous presentation of the modernization decision and an offer of negotiation:

--The deployments planned:

	<u>Launchers*</u>	<u>Warheads</u>	<u>Countries</u>
Pershing II	108	108	FRG
GLCM	24	96	FRG
GLCM	40	160	Great Britain
GLCM	28	112	Italy
GLCM	12	48	Belgium
GLCM	12	48	The Netherlands
Totals	224	572	

* The GLCM's (Cruise missiles) will be deployed on launching trucks 4 by 4.

These deployments should begin in 1983 and extend over several years.

--The offer of negotiations relates to the land-based medium-range American and Soviet theater weapons. The Alliance's internal decision summaries stress in particular that;

--the negotiations on limitation of weaponry encompassing the TNF (Theater Nuclear Forces) should not involve the non-American allied systems; nor would the United States have to negotiate any compensations with the Soviets for such systems;

--the negotiations on the TNF should be conducted within the framework of SALT III;

--the negotiations on TNF within the framework of SALT III should have as a postulate the United States' declaration on the grey-zones systems:

"Any future limitation of the American systems designed principally for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations of the Soviet theater systems";

--the armaments-control effort relative to TNF should go hand in hand with modernization.

II. How Do Matters Stand Today with This Double Approach, Especially As Regards Negotiation?

In this regard, I would like to contrast the ups and downs that have marked the discussions among our allies with the remarkable continuity of the objectives and reactions of the Soviet Union.

A. The Ups and Downs and Hesitations of Certain of Our Allies:

1) Under the Carter presidency, the approach decided on on 12 December 1979 was not without difficulties, since on the very day that the decision was tak-

en, the Belgian authorities announced "implementation of this decision on Belgian territory would have to be confirmed in May 1980 by the Belgian government after analysis of any positive response by the Soviet Union, expressed by practical measures appropriate for reestablishing a situation of equilibrium, to the appeal made to it by NATO." As for the Dutch government, it indicated that it would announce a decision before December 1981 "in function of a continuous evaluation of the degree of success of the efforts made to achieve an effective and balanced limitation of the long-range theater nuclear forces of the two camps." To date, this reticence, combined with these two countries' internal difficulties, have not yet made it possible for them to take any clear decision other than this: "Let us give the negotiations every chance."

2) These reservations on the part of the two small Alliance countries concerned were, at one time, combined with the impression of "vacuum" created by the fact that for nearly a year, the Reagan administration left room for doubt about its desire to resume strategic talks with the USSR. The European governments concerned, besieged by active pacifist movements, were therefore particularly devoid of arguments to use vis-a-vis their public opinion. That is why for a year they put out every possible effort vis-a-vis Washington in order for the Soviet-American "preliminary discussions" on the INF [international nuclear forces] which under Mr Carter were not able to get anywhere (17 October-17 November 1980), to be resumed. It was on 30 November 1981, as you know, that the talks were started again in Geneva--in a different ambience, it is true, and with the idea that their results would be set within the framework of the START (Strategic Armament Reduction Treaty) talks, which in principle are to begin next March/April. Meanwhile, all the consultations of the two NATO groups meeting on this subject had taken place, and in the course of them our European allies had striven to get the Americans back to the terms of the decision of 12 December 1979, particularly as regards its negotiation aspect. For reasons that you will understand, I will not go into detail about these discussions. But it is obvious that as regards the "parameters" of the reductions to be proposed, a number of variants are conceivable; as I told you in the first part of this presentation, the Americans intend to ask for:

--reduction of the land-based intermediate-range systems, which they consider the "most destabilizing." This obviously covers the SS-4's and SS-5's as well as the SS-20's. But several problems arise:

--Are the "reloadings" of these systems to be taken into account or not?

--What criterion should be adopted: ceilings on the launchers, on the warheads + the reloadings?

--Must all the SS-20's deployed in the USSR be covered, without taking into account whether they are east or west of the Urals? Is the reply obviously "yes" in view of the mobility and range of these missiles?

--Isn't an evasion of these agreements "upward," and especially downward (since shorter-range systems can threaten West Europe just as well as the SS-22's and SS-23's do) to be feared?

Another general question: at one stage or another, shouldn't the Soviet long-range bomber fleet (more than 2,000 Soviet aircraft) be spoken of also? On this point, the Americans appear to make it only a subject for later discussion:

--in order to keep the emphasis on the Soviet unilateralism in deployment of the SS-20's;

--in order not to throw a monkey-wrench into the "mechanics" of the taking-into-account of the FBS [expansion unknown] constantly rejected in SALT I and SALT II.

Another general question: what about an agreement's methods of verification, which cannot be based solely on national means?

The last question: what is the desirable ceiling level? This enables me to talk to you about the "zero option."

As you know, what the press has thus named is an echo of President Reagan's remarks to the American National Press Club on 17 November: he indicated that if the USSR were to dismantle all its SS-20's and withdraw its SS-4's and SS-5's, the decision for modernization of NATO would lose its rationale. You will note that this kind of attitude, inspired by the FRG, has a triple aspect:

--it has a didactic aspect vis-a-vis the agitated public opinion of the pacifist currents by demonstrating the USSR's responsibility in the creation of an imbalance that is the cause of the modernization decided on by NATO;

--it has a dangerous side, in my opinion: that it actually contradicts the reasoning that underlay the decision of 12 December 1979, which implicitly stressed that in any case, a minimum of modernization was indispensable for the credibility of "flexible response" in the era of strategic parity;

--it rests, in any case, on the bet that the USSR would not throw the ball right back. And indeed, it does not appear to have taken it. This constitutes a good transition for describing:

B. The Continuity of the Soviet Approach, despite Successive Tactical Adjustments and a Number of "False" Gestures of Good Will Intended for European Public Opinion:

In effect, the USSR wants, on the one hand, to take all legitimacy away from NATO's modernization effort by disputing the data on which our allies' analyses are based. It therefore proposes a freeze, a moratorium on the deployments of the SS-20's and of the American systems; this would be equivalent, for the West, to implicitly recognizing the legitimacy of the SS-20 deployments at the present level.

And on the other hand, it wants--as has been its constant objective since SALT I and SALT II--to obtain a negotiation that would concern all of what it calls the American advanced-base systems--that is, the American carrier-based planes (A-6's and A-7's), the F-4's and, of course, the F-111 bombers stationed in Great Britain and in the United States, as well as the French and British third forces.

In counterpart, they appear disposed--that is what Mr Brezhnev said publicly in Bonn--to withdraw their systems of more than 1,000-km range: SS-4's, SS-5's, SS-20's stationed in Europe and certain airplanes (Backfire, Blinder), but not all, and only those which are likewise stationed in Europe.

In this way, Moscow is giving itself all possible latitude for maneuver:

--In their accounting, the Soviets hold that a balance of FNI's exists if one compares the Soviet systems capable of hitting West Europe and the Western systems capable of hitting Soviet territory.

As against 940 Soviet launchers, they cite more than 700 American planes, 110 British carrier vehicles and 144 French systems, for a total of 986 launchers.

--Starting from that point, they declare that the 572 missiles of the modernization effort would create an imbalance to the advantage of NATO, whereas SALT consecrated the principle of "equal security" and of "parity."

Now when one looks at the figures announced by Moscow, and the prospects opened up by the Soviets for reductions of launchers in terms of "hundreds," one notes that if our allies were so weak as to accept both the Soviet data and the system categories whose reduction is proposed by the USSR, one could arrive, for example, at the following result: the Soviet Union, in exchange for withdrawal of all of the American nuclear means in Europe, contrives to claim the right to keep as many SS-20's as are necessary to "compensate for" the French and British forces. On such an hypothesis:

--not only would Moscow foil the modernization of NATO;

--but it would in a way use our allies against us and the English.

I add that the Russians have given themselves additional latitude of maneuver when, in Bonn, Mr Brezhnev, "reversing" in a way the "zero option," declared that a true zero option would consist in the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from the European theater, including the short-range weapons. We will hear this spoken of again, I think. And this corresponds to the old Soviet aim (from the 1950's) of denuclearization of Central Europe, which at that time had become hostage to the all-powerful Soviet sway.

III. As You Will Understand, with Such Stakes...

The stakes of the future of the American nuclear protection assured to Europe, the stakes of the transatlantic relations which that perception covers, in terms of the perception on both sides, and the stakes in continuation of our defense effort: /it was difficult for us to keep silent/.

This whole matter is indeed preoccupying in more than one way:

a) It is clear that despite efforts at explanation by the governments, there is a disparity between:

--the continual growth of the Soviet Union's military potential--its intermediate nuclear weapons, among other things--which places it in a position to threaten the entirety of NATO's means of response--that is, to hold the European countries hostage;

--and the development of pacifist movements challenging the compensatory measures to be taken, which are logical and legitimate. It is all as if the in-

forming and educating of public opinion that are the task of those who govern were no longer functioning well. The new generations must understand that the peace from which Europe has benefited for 30 years has been based on maintenance of a balance of forces that makes deterrence of any aggression possible.

France, for its part, is taking account of the global evolution of the threat and is taking the decisions aimed at modernizing and filling out its means of deterrence.

b) Rejecting a policy of comfortable silence, the new French government has shown in very clear terms that it is not indifferent to the evolution of the conditions of security of its European partners.

That is why it has supported without reserve or ambiguity--but from the "outside," in a way, since we are not members of the Integrated Military Organization--the double decision of 12 December 1979 (the desire to rectify the situation by deciding on deployment of 464 Cruise missiles and modernization of 108 Pershing missiles capable of hitting the margins of Soviet territory; and the desire to arrive at effective limitations and reductions of these types of weapons with a proportion of American negotiation addressed to the Soviets [as published]).

It is quite obvious that the problem would be presented in a totally different light if the Soviets withdrew the SS-4's and the SS-5's and dismantled the SS-20's which today might lead them to believe that they could hold West Europe hostage with impunity, from the shelter of their sanctuary. The French government has not hesitated to say this publicly and to repeat it to its interlocutors of the East.

A situation in which the Soviet Union would spontaneously renounce a position of force is not, unfortunately, going to emerge tomorrow. It has not left Afghanistan, and it will not renounce its armaments without trying to obtain some counterpart dangerous for Western security.

Thus the real prospect that opens up is at best a freeze and at worst a continuance of the Soviet deployments at considerable levels, while the Soviet-American talks recently started in Geneva go on in parallel.

c) But--and this is another subject of concern for us--one must not believe that reality is suddenly transformed because a negotiation is opening.

Detente is not being reborn because a dialogue is starting; the Soviet Union's general behavior is not modified for all that, and the basic facts of Europe's real security are not now all new ones. Let us keep some comfortable illusions [as published]. Now the disabled public opinion of the European countries will be inclined to ask that the armament deployments planned in order to compensate for the Soviet threat be suspended for so long as there are chances of a positive outcome of the negotiations to come. The governments of the countries concerned will doubtlessly need a lot of courage and great determination in order to resist this reassuring but illusory temptation.

d) We are also concerned about the reasoning of those who imagine that one part or another of Europe or West Europe could escape the logic of the global relationship of forces.

Nothing would be more illusory and dangerous than to imagine one or more negotiations aimed at defining a nuclear equilibrium just for Europe or at segmenting it into zones called "denuclearized." Nor, by the very reason of the characteristics of modern nuclear armaments, which are capable of striking decisive blows anywhere and very quickly, and by reason of the geographic asymmetries that favor Soviet pressure on West Europe, can the security of the European countries be conditioned by equilibriums in one category or another of armaments. Today, West Europe can be hit by Soviet nuclear systems stationed east of the Urals, or at sea, and also by the whole of the USSR's strategic systems. That is why we consider it necessary for the discussions just started between the United States and the USSR on their intermediate-range weapons to be conducted within the framework of SALT or rather of START. We are pleased that President Reagan has decided to resume these negotiations in which, we hope, the United States and the USSR will be able to arrive at a reduction of their gigantic arsenals, with a general equilibrium of their forces maintained.

e) Finally, the French forces remain out of proportion with the two formidable arsenals of the USSR and the United States.

They ensure our country's security under conditions that are peculiar to them and which, I stress, do not justify any comparison with nuclear means of other countries:

--the French forces constitute an independent system whose characteristics correspond to a doctrine and a reasoning that are our own;

--that is why we consider that they should not in any way be taken into account in the negotiations between the USSR and the United States, relating exclusively to the nuclear forces of those two countries.

The president of the republic has had occasion to recall that, moreover, we do not have the means for negotiating even a part of our nuclear armament, unless we were to fall below the threshold of credibility of our deterrent force.

The Soviet Union is, of course, trying to get people to believe the idea of the necessity of taking the French and British forces into account in the Soviet-American negotiations. We have firmly reminded the Soviets of our position.

This is not negotiable, and we hope that our allies, for their part, will take our position with the greatest seriousness, just as we respect theirs. The very interest of Western security is involved here.

11267

CSO: 3100/655

OIL EXPERT DOUBTS VIABILITY OF NORWAY, SWEDEN GAS PIPELINE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 29 Apr 82 p 8

[Article by Peter Sandberg]

[Text] Goteborg, Wednesday, 28 Apr 82--"Five times as much gas would have to be found as has been found so far near Troms before it would be profitable to recover the gas and construct a gas pipeline through Sweden. I cannot imagine that this project would be carried out before the year 2,000."

This was stated by the Norwegian oil expert Ole Jakob Kvinsland at an offshore seminar in Goteborg on Wednesday.

O. J. Kvinsland, who is editor of the magazine NOROIL and a consultant within the offshore industry, spoke at a symposium on the possibility of industrial companies' entering the offshore market in the North Sea.

O. J. Kvinsland stated that the North Sea field, although it is not the most productive, was the most significant region in the world for the petroleum industry. This is because it has the strictest safety requirements as well as the most difficult working conditions. If it is possible to work in the North Sea, it is possible to work anywhere.

"The most important tasks are to gain knowledge, identify the problems, and find solutions. Otherwise, it will not be possible to produce that which is demanded," Kvinsland said and he stated that Swedish industry had not been especially successful in this endeavor.

Not Too Late

It is not too late for Swedish industry to enter the market, however, he said.

According to Kvinsland, the present investment rate in the North Sea, about 8 billion dollars annually, will remain the same or increase somewhat. In this case, the drop in oil prices is less important than tax policies in England, Norway, and Denmark.

He predicted that the oil companies in England would succeed in their campaign

for better tax conditions and that the temporary slowdown in planned investments would end. During the eighties, work in the Sleipner Field (a gas field) will require large investments.

"This field contains 'sour gas' from which carbon dioxide must be removed. This is an opportunity for Swedish industry which is a top producer of corrosion-resistant steel," Kvinsland said.

During the nineties the major project will be the Troll oil and gas field where Shell is operating in one corner of the field today. The field stretches over four blocks which will be distributed next month.

"It is six to ten times larger than the Frigg Field, stretches over 700 km², and has a depth of over 300 m. About 60 large underwater installations and a large number of floating platforms will be needed. Fixed platforms cannot be used because of conditions on the ocean bed."

9336

CSO: 3109/154

INDUSTRY LEADER ATTACKS GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON ECONOMY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 14 May 82 Sec III p 2

[Article by Frank Dahlgaard]

[Text] "Anker Jorgensen's and Ritt Bjerregaard's deficit policies have made it much too expensive to invest in new jobs in private business. The enormous sale of state bonds has pushed capital costs sky-high, so that it is very hard today to find any profitable investments."

This strong criticism of the government's policies was presented by director of the Novo concern Kaare B. Dullum to the leaders of the Danish financial world. This occurred in a speech to the Danish Financial Analysts' Society which held a seminar in Copenhagen yesterday on "prospects for the Danish stock market."

Director Kaare B. Dullum: "The explosive development in the national deficit means less and less capital available for business, capital that is becoming increasingly expensive. When investors in this country are offered state bonds with an effective interest rate of 22 percent, most of which is in the form of tax-free profits due to appreciation, there are not many who will buy stocks. The outlook is not bright, for both Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen and Ritt Bjerregaard have stated that the state deficit cannot be eliminated."

Systematic Risk

The Novo director then reviewed industry's opportunities for acquiring cheap capital for investments:

"The so-called K [expansion unknown] loans can hardly be extended much longer because the difference between the interest paid by the borrowers and the interest the state pays to obtain the money must be paid by the taxpayers."

In general Dullum said that the economic policy pursued in this country has led to a "high systematic risk" involved in owning Danish bonds as well as stocks.

"For this reason, pension funds will probably start buying foreign securities in time."

As a result of the bleak prospects in this country, the Novo concern has chosen to acquire stock capital abroad. Thus in 1978 they went on the London Stock Exchange and in 1981 on the U.S. Stock Exchange.

"A typical Danish stock offering is at a rate of 105 with a simultaneous issuing of fund stocks. In reality this means capital costs of 20-23 percent and with that kind of capital costs, it is often much too costly to establish jobs. But these costs are not taken into consideration in the public sector where they can hire people freely."

Price/Earnings Ratio

The Novo director went on to say that the price of stocks per kronen earned in Denmark is as low as 5-7 kroner while the price on the London Stock Exchange is around 12-13 kroner and as high as 18-19 kroner on the American stock market. Thus the price level is substantially higher abroad.

The Novo concern is the largest firm listed today on the stock exchange in Copenhagen and Novo stocks have increased formidably in the last 2 years: from a rate around 250 in 1980 to a rate of over 1600 today--in other words a six- to seven-fold increase in the value of the stocks.

Director Kaare B. Dullum recommended to other Danish firms that want to be listed on foreign exchanges that they first be listed on the Danish exchange. Otherwise there is a risk of big speculative price fluctuations on the stocks.

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CSO: 3106/118

ECONOMIC ADVISERS: GOVERNMENT ON RIGHT PATH, UPTURN SOON

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 4 May 82 p 11

[Article by Vivian Jordansen]

[Text] Upturn This Year?

The chairmanship of the Economic Council sees a weak light ahead in its latest economic report. A big upturn will slowly become evident on the international market arena as early as this year, the economic experts believe.

The almost total economic stagnation currently prevailing here at home and abroad should ease somewhat during the year, the economic experts predict. Production and consumption are expected to increase, but unemployment will continue to rise a little this year.

No Drop in Inflation

However the Economic Council is concerned as to whether Denmark will be able to make use of the full value of the anticipated upturn in the international economy.

It is the inflation in this country that concerns the economists. The inflation rate in Denmark is not showing the same decline as in the other industrial lands. And according to the Economic Council it is precisely the declining inflation in the West coupled with declining oil prices that provided the basis for optimism.

The reason why inflationary pressures are greater in Denmark than in other countries is that wages rise more rapidly here than they do abroad while at the same time, consumer prices are rising more slowly than before.

Disturbing

The economists call this tendency "disturbing" and a threat to Denmark's opportunities to solve the basic economic problems in the long run.

Viewed in isolation, this tendency is good for wage earners, because it means a real wage increase, but the economic experts' concern over the tendency is due to the effect on competitiveness, in other words the ability of Danish industry and agriculture to sell products abroad.

The economists' concern over competitiveness is not diminished by the fact that the improvement in competitiveness we have experienced since 1979 is due largely to several devaluations of the kronen. And according to the Economic Council, this instrument for improving competitiveness declined after the latest devaluation in January when the other countries in the EMS [European Monetary System] currency system [words omitted].

The Economic Council reached the bleak conclusion that without further improvement in competitiveness, Denmark's foreign economy this year cannot be expected to do as well as it did last year. Simply because industrial exports cannot rise as much this year as they did last year.

Labor Business Council: Wages Not Decisive

The Economic Council does not need to be so concerned about the competitiveness of Danish industry. That is the opinion of Bent Greve, economist with the Labor Movement's Business Council.

"Of course it is important to discuss competitiveness, since it means a lot for our economy, the amount we can sell abroad," said Bent Greve, "but I think the Economic Council is misleading the discussion by saying that competitiveness is solely a question of wages and foreign exchange.

Doubtful

"The concept of competitiveness also involves productivity, the ability to sell products and develop those products other countries can use and we can put on the market first."

According to the labor movement's own economist, the Economic Council has too dark a view of Denmark's chances of participating in the anticipated economic upturn.

The Economic Council's concern over competitiveness is based on the report's estimate that wage increases will be higher here than abroad.

"I do not share that viewpoint," said Bent Greve. It is absolutely uncertain whether the Economic Council's predictions on wage increases will prove correct. I find it doubtful."

Praise

But Bent Greve also praised the Economic Council. The praise was because the report brings up some things for discussion.

"I think it is very important that the Economic Council leads up in this report to a discussion of public versus private production in a time of high unemployment. I am particularly struck by the fact that the Economic Council lays to rest the idea that all public production is inevitably bad."

High Interest Unpopular

The Big Upturn in the international economy which will show up soon, according to the latest Economic Council report, has been very slow in coming and that is due to the high-interest policy President Reagan in the United States has imposed on the entire western world.

The Economic Council writes that the upward tendencies in the international economy have been present for some time, but they have had a hard time breaking through because of economic policy and the extremely high interest rates in many countries.

Unpopular

The reason why the Economic Council is now daring to believe in the Big Upturn is that the high-interest policy that has checked the economy for so long is gradually becoming thoroughly unpopular in the trend-setting industrial nations, the economic experts say.

The cost of fighting inflation with high interest is too great. Unemployment is rising sharply, businesses are going bankrupt in droves, declining investments and lost production opportunities are the costs of high-interest policy.

The industrial lands will no longer pay that price and that is why the Economic Council now predicts that President Reagan's economic brake on the international economy will be somewhat weakened.

Shorter Work Hours an "Anti-Solution"

The Economic Council is not wildly enthusiastic about the economic consequences of solving unemployment through a general reduction of work time.

In the latest Economic Council report, a whole chapter has been devoted to a discussion of reducing work hours, a demand several unions, among them the Metalworkers Union, will present during the next contract negotiations.

The Economic Council calls any kind of work-time reduction an "anti-solution" because curtailing work hours is simply a disguised form of unemployment and under any circumstances it is a waste of labor and production opportunities.

The only reason why the Economic Council discussed a reduction of work time is that we might come into a situation where we have abandoned producing our way out of our problems. Only in that situation can the Economic Council go along with reducing work time as an alternative.

Vicious Circle

The Economic Council report lists three different ways of reducing work time and although there are some shades of difference, the report is equally negative concerning all three models.

The worst model is the one in which wage earners get full compensation from their employers for cutting their work hours. According to the Economic Council this would lead to a marked decline in competitiveness, then a production decline and more unemployment. There would be a real wage decline which in turn would lead to new wage demands. In the words of the economists, "a vicious circle."

The second model involves wage earners themselves paying for the reduced work time with an income decline even for those working full-time, which would not be quite as unfavorable for the national economy, according to the Economic Council. Real income would not decline, but the Economic Council does not like that model either. The economists are worried that such a model would come only if the state pays some compensation and that would increase the tax burden which in turn leads to increased wage demands so that the compensation from the state does not disappear again.

A third possibility envisioned by the Economic Council is expanded opportunities to opt for early retirement, sabbatical arrangements, extended maternity leaves, etc. The people who removed themselves entirely or temporarily from the labor force would have public compensation on a par with the daily unemployment rate for otherwise no wage earner would be likely to take time off voluntarily.

The Economic Council calls this model the most favorable for consumers of the three models. But the economists have the same reservations as they have with respect to the second model. They fear an increased tax burden that in turn sets off increased pressure for wage compensation.

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ECONOMIC ADVISERS, GOVERNMENT DISAGREE ON ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 May 82 p 26

[Article by Frank Dahlgaard]

[Text] It is not just the Economic Council and government economists who are sharply divided over economic developments this year. The government's own economists also disagree among themselves with regard to public growth.

The independent economists of the Economic Council and government economists sharply disagree on a number of decisive points concerning how the Danish economy will develop.

This disagreement will undoubtedly be discussed when the Economic Council meets this afternoon to discuss its economic report. For both department chief Kurt Hansen of the Economic Affairs Ministry and department chief Erling Jorgensen of the Budget Department happen to be members of the Economic Council.

The disagreement is primarily over developments in business investments and exports. In the table, BERLINGSKE TIDENDE has summarized the estimates of the Economic Council and the Economic Affairs Ministry for a number of key elements in the Danish economy in 1982. For comparative purposes, we have also shown estimates from the latest OECD report on Denmark which was published in January.

First, the area in which there is near agreement on developments:

All three reports expect 1982 unemployment to lie around 260,000 people. There is also close agreement on the growth of consumer prices from 1981 to 1982 (inflation), namely around 9 percent. But there the agreement ends.

Less Growth

The independent economists anticipate an economic growth of less than 2 percent from 1981 to 1982, while the Economic Affairs Ministry anticipates an

increase in the national product of as much as 3 1/2 percent. If we believe the government economists, only Japan will have a higher growth rate than Denmark this year.

The OECD economists in Paris also thought at the beginning of the year that growth in Denmark would be over 3 percent this year, but the Economic Council economists do not believe that. In contrast to the Economic Council report from the fall of 1981, the current report has adjusted the growth estimate downward for 1982 from 2.8 percent to 1.9 percent.

The Economic Council economists also think private consumption, home construction, business investments and exports will increase much less than the government has estimated.

Investment Decline

The various estimates of business investments are especially striking.

The OECD and the government anticipate an investment growth of 11-12 percent, while the Economic Council anticipates a direct decline of over 2 percent. If the Economic Council is right in its bleak forecast, it will be the fourth year in a row that business investments have declined. The Economic Council also expects the investment decline to continue into next year, when it is estimated that investment activity will be almost 5 percent below the 1982 level.

Unfortunately, the latest figures from the Danish Bureau of Statistics suggest that the Economic Council predictions are closest to actual developments. Since both the government and the Economic Council investment figures include energy investments (among them, the oil pipeline), the picture looks extremely bleak for purely private business investments.

Exports

In the area of housing construction, the government anticipates a growth of 5 percent this year, while the Economic Council is predicting a decline of a little under 4 percent. The government is expecting 25,000 housing starts this year, while the Economic Council anticipates only 22,000 housing starts.

And in the area of export developments too, the government is more optimistic than the Economic Council. The government estimates a real growth of 5 percent, while the Economic Council predicts a growth of less than 1 percent. The difference is related to the fact that the government is expecting economic growth in the western world from 1981 to 1982 of 1 1/4 percent, while the Economic Council expects a growth of 1/2 of 1 percent. The latest signals from OECD in Paris indicate that here too the Economic Council has come closer to the truth.

If one looks at the export of industrial products alone, the government anticipates an increase of 6 percent this year, while the Economic Council expects a rise of only 2 percent.

Payments Deficit

The Economic Council's belief in a substantially more depressed Danish economy this year is reflected in a balance of payments deficit prediction of only 13 billion kroner this year. The government anticipates a deficit of over 15 billion kroner and the OECD estimate is over 17 billion kroner.

Next year, the government expects a payments deficit of almost 18 billion kroner, while the Economic Council experts set the 1983 deficit at only 14.4 billion (unless there is some intervention).

With regard to developments in the public sector, there are also clear disagreements between the Economic Affairs Ministry and the Economic Council. The former estimates public growth at 2 percent, with 25,000 more public employees, while the latter estimates growth of 3 percent, with 35,000 more public employees. At the same time, the Economic Affairs Ministry predicts that employment in the private business sector will decline by only a few thousand jobs this year, while the Economic Council predicts a decline of 26,000 in the number of private jobs.

State Growth?

One would think that when it comes to predicting developments in the public sector, the government economists would have the best qualifications. But it is a known fact that officials from the Economic Affairs Ministry and the Budget Department have presented different figures in this area!

While people in the Economic Affairs Ministry anticipate a higher growth in the number of public employees this year than last year (from 3 1/2 to 4 1/2 percent), the latest budget figures from the Budget Department show a declining growth (from 5 to 3 percent).

The Economic Council believes in increasing public growth and, as we mentioned, it expects the number of public employees to surpass the Economic Affairs Ministry's estimate. A major reason for the variations in this area is different assessments of the effect of the "job-creating provision."

The following table shows the estimates given by the OECD report, the government's "Economic Survey" and the Economic Council report for a number of key figures affecting the Danish economy in 1982.

Three Forecasts of the Danish Economy in 1982

<u>Sector</u>	<u>OECD</u>	<u>Government</u>	<u>Economic</u>
	<u>Jan 82</u>	<u>Mar 82</u>	<u>Council</u> <u>May 82</u>
Unemployment	250,000	260,000	264,000
Payments deficit (in billions of kroner)	17-18	15.2	13.0
Growth, 1981-1982 (in percentages, except "Public employees")			
Inflation	8 1/2	9 1/2	9 1/2
National product	3 1/4	3 1/2	1.9
Private consumption	2 1/2	2 1/2	1.5
Business investments	11	12	- 2.2
Housing construction	- 10	5	- 3.6
Public sector	2	2	3.0
Public employees	--	25,000	35,000
Exports	5 1/2	5	0.8
Imports	5 3/4	6 1/2	1.0

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ECONOMIC

DENMARK

BRIEFS

RECYCLING FUNDS PROPOSED--The government is now requesting funds from the Folketing Finance Committee for the part of its program of action that covers public subsidies for various recycling projects. Environmental Affairs Minister Erik Holst is seeking 25 million kroner for investment subsidies for public and private recycling projects. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 May 82 p 7] 6578

CSO: 3106/111

CONTROVERSY ON CONTINUING SWING CREDIT TO GDR

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 12 May 82 p 4

/Article by Peter Jochen Winters, datelined Berlin, 11 May: "The Swing Is Not a Sharp Weapon. The "Politico-Psychological Connection" with the Minimum Exchange"

/Text/ 30 June marks the day when the extension--granted by Bonn--of the agreement with the GDR on the current amount of the interest-free overdraft in inner-German trade (swing) finally expires. The closer this date approaches, the more violent the GDR's war of nerves against the Federal Government's proclaimed "politico-psychological connection" between swing and minimum exchange. At their meeting at the Werbellin Lake Federal Chancellor Schmidt believed GDR Council of State chairman Honecker to have intimated that a reduction in the radical increase in the compulsory exchange, decreed in October 1980, was to be expected. As a quid pro quo the Federal Government was prepared to let the swing continue at its present level of DM850 million per annum. This is not the place to investigate whether Honecker did or did not promise anything of the sort. It is a fact, however, that the internal situation of the Schmidt-Genscher Government has weakened considerably since December last. Honecker would be a poor politician if he were not to exploit this weakness for the benefit of the GDR.

As far as the GDR is concerned, the facts of the matter appear as follows: It is interested in not having the flow of visitors from the West increase again--that would amount to a security risk; at the same time it would prefer not to give up the interest-free overdraft, because to do so would place an even greater burden on its precarious foreign exchange balance. It must therefore try to break up the coupling of the reduction in the minimum exchange and the extension of the swing (though, in fact, Bonn introduced this coupling, it was never put in so many words).

In October 1980 the minimum exchange was raised from DM13 daily for visits to the GDR and DM6.50 for a daytime visit to East Berlin only to a standard DM25 per person -- and day. At the same time the same amount was made obligatory for retired seniors who had formerly been altogether exempt from the compulsory exchange, and juveniles from ages 7-16, earlier also exempt, were made to exchange DM7.50 per person and day. This represented a serious reverse for the Federal Government's Germany policy, aimed at the expansion of human contacts in the divided country. Tourism and family travel by West Berliners to the GDR and East Berlin declined by about 50 percent; a 25 percent decrease was noted in similar travels by West Germans. The radical increase in the compulsory exchange was a blatant violation of the business base of

German-German treaty politics. Initially the Federal Government expressed strong dismay and informed East Berlin that no progress in German-German treaty politics could be expected before an East Berlin retreat.

However, the Federal Government's resolution tended to be forgotten the longer the time elapsed. Without the GDR showing the least inclination to make concessions, the chancellor traveled to see Honecker in December last and, as a gift to his host, brought along the extension of the swing agreement by half a year (it was set to expire on 31 December 1981). On behalf of the Federal Government Federal Minister Franke clearly stated that the interest-free overdraft would go back to DM200 million (from DM850 million) as of 30 June 1982, unless something had moved by then in the matter of compulsory exchange. Yet even this clear statement has tended to be forgotten in recent months.

To demonstrate that it did not really need the swing so badly as was assumed in the Federal Republic, the GDR made a tremendous effort in 1981 in order to be able to point out at the end of the year that it had called on only half the amount of the interest-free overdraft. This demonstration had quite an impact on the West German public. Increasingly voices were raised claiming that the swing was not a suitable "lever" against the compulsory exchange. Conversely little notice is taken of the fact that the GDR has since called on some DM600 million of interest-free overdraft in inner-German trade.

East Berlin is well aware that Bonn knows this. It has therefore been trying for weeks by "psychological warfare" to extract the maximum of benefits for the minimum of concessions in the current negotiations with Bonn. It is quite of a piece with these tactics for State Secretary Schalck, Honecker's foreign exchange negotiator, allegedly telling State Secretary Boelling quite bluntly at their latest talks that a reduction in the minimum exchange is not negotiable. Other weapons in this war of nerves are the "deliberate leaks" regarding a vote against Honecker in the SED Politburo which is said to have refused any reduction in the compulsory exchange, and alleged plans for once again exempting senior citizens and juveniles from the compulsory exchange but raising to DM35 or DM45 the rates for all other visitors.

The same applies to reports that the GDR would agree to halving the swing if Bonn were to obligate itself to grant the other half as an interest bearing overdraft. Also to be appraised as part of East Berlin's psychological warfare are reports that the GDR, though inclined to leave the compulsory exchange unchanged, would agree to lower by 5 years the travel age of GDR residents living near the border and make concessions with regard to non-commercial payment transactions.

All these reports, launched by East Berlin, ultimately serve it for testing the reactions of the West German public, including Bonn politicians, and to see how far the GDR can go with impunity. As the reactions show, many in the Federal Republic are definitely impressed and made anxious by these East Berlin "test reports." In such a situation firmness, resolution and loyalty to principle are needed. We will soon see whether the Schmidt-Genscher Government can still boast these characteristics, or whether it will allow itself to be deluded by the East Berlin illusionists.

PAPER WARNS ON OVEROPTIMISTIC VIEW OF ECONOMY REPORT

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 29 Apr 82 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] The economic downturn has bottomed out, at least in Sweden. In 1982 the trade balance will make a 5 billion kronor turnaround from a deficit to a surplus. Exports are rising and will increase even more in 1983. The international market for Swedish export goods is increasing and, in addition, Swedish exports can increase their share of the market, since the devaluation of September 1981 is now resulting in relatively lower export prices. Unemployment will drop slightly during 1983.

This, in summary, is the picture of the future presented in the revised budget proposal. Compared to the January predictions, this is an improvement that is clearly above the margin of error.

This may be a true picture, but these predictions assume that the budget proposal is correct on several uncertain points.

First of all, the international economic picture is unclear. Industrial production is falling in the United States. The United States has had extremely high real interest rates for about 18 months. This is not stopping present investments, but probably will retard future investments. The great decline in investments in the United States probably will come during the next 18 months.

The West German policy is split: the government is attempting to increase investments, while the Bundesbank is trying to hold inflation down.

Swedish exports are extremely sensitive to economic trends. Swedish exports are dominated by input goods for investments that fluctuate along with international economic trends. The consumer-goods industry has a more stable market and, thus, may act as a stabilizing influence, but it is more wage-intensive and has been more or less neutralized by the extremely high wage costs in Sweden.

Swedish exports represent only a percent or so of world trade. Because of this,

popular wisdom indicates that Sweden can do well even in a stagnating market. The idea is that if our exports make only a per mill increase in the world market, our export volume will rise by 10 percent.

This is true--in theory. In practice, the relative price of Swedish goods must go down so that the price difference exceeds the purchaser's costs for changing manufacturers. Thus, the export predictions in the budget proposal--the cornerstone of our economic policy--are extremely sensitive to inflation and wage increases.


Wirten hopes that last year's devaluation will hold the relative prices down, but will this be enough for our industry to regain lost shares of the market--which is presupposed in his hopes. It should be remembered that the devaluation merely adjusted the krona to changes in international exchange rates following interest hikes in the United States. It did not decrease Swedish export prices of 1980--which were much too high.

Practically all analyses of the Swedish economy--of foreign trade, industry, and the labor market--lead to the conclusion that the cost of labor has been much too high since the irresponsible wage settlements in 1974 and 1975. The graph of the "real wage gap" presented by OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) shows the difference between real wage costs and the real national income, i.e. the difference between the increase in wage costs and the increase in production. Around 1975 these costs lost all contact with reality and it has not yet been restored. This problem cannot be analyzed simply in terms of "social justice."

As usual, the budget proposal indicates the maximum values which increased prices and wage costs may not exceed if the export figures are to be valid. It is difficult to make such specifications, however, if one does not know how exchange rates and costs in competing countries will vary. It would be more objectively correct to differentiate between means and ends--to indicate a certain improvement in the trade balance as a goal and state that the relative wage costs must drop sufficiently for the goal to be reached.

Of course, wage costs are linked to inflation and inflation is linked to the budget deficit and the financing of this deficit. The government has managed to change the direction of these trends. In both the national budget and the consolidated public sector the deficit is 6 to 7 billion below the January prediction. Clearly, the much criticized cutbacks have begun to take effect.

The budget deficit has become a strait jacket for economic policies. If it is financed on the credit market, interest rates are driven up, making industrial investments difficult. The part financed by the Bank of Sweden an/or abroad increases the volume of money in circulation, thereby increasing the inflationary pressure. There is no alternative to a policy that reduces public expenditures, or at least there is no reasonable alternative, although other alternatives have been presented.



The OECD graph of the Swedish "real wage gap" shows how real wage costs have increased compared to the real national income.

Key to graph:

A Real wages

B Real national income

C Year

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CS0: 3109/154

MINISTER'S REVISED ECONOMY REPORT SEEN ENCOURAGING

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 29 Apr 82 p 9

[Commentary by Jan Magnus Fahlstrom]

[Text] After 1 year in New York, Jan Magnus Fahlstrom has returned to the editorial board in Stockholm. He will continue to follow international economic developments, but he will also write on Swedish economic trends.

In 1981 the Swedish economy was somewhat better than believed in early 1982. In certain areas, 1982 may be a slightly better year, or at least not as bad, than 1981. The situation will be much better in 1983.

This is an approximate summary of the revised budget proposal presented on Wednesday by Budget and Economy Minister Rolf Wirtén.

Among the items in the balance of resources for 1981 (see table) that now appear to be somewhat better than the even more preliminary figures from January are industrial investments, housing construction, and private consumption. They did not decline quite as much as previously thought. The export volume, which was thought to have dropped, seems to have increased slightly.

Restrained

The overall results of economic activity, the gross national product (GNP), was revised downward slightly, however, from -0.8 to -0.9 percent.

Of course, this may be seen as reflecting an unexpectedly powerful effect of intentional restraint with public expenditures.

But foreign business in 1981 was also lower than indicated in the earlier figures. The deficit in the trade balance rose from 14.1 to 15.7 billion, which is due entirely to the exchange of goods (trade balance).

With regard to business abroad, the government--and the rest of us--can console ourselves with the fact that it declined less in 1981 than in 1980. Despite rising interest payments on foreign loans, the deficit in the trade

balance dropped from 18.8 to 15.7 billion.

Uncertain

But the considerable differences between the January and April 1982 figures on what happened last year, i.e. between different (still preliminary) estimates after the fact, indicate how much more uncertain estimates and guesses are of what will happen in 1982 and especially in 1983.

With regard to 1982, Rolf Wirten believes there will be a relatively sharp increase in the export volume, by 5.7 percent. This means that the expectations in January, when the estimate was 6.7 percent, have been dampened somewhat. At the same time, industrial investments are expected to drop by 11.3 percent, compared to 5.0 percent in the January prediction. This is an even more rapid decline than the 8.4 percent in 1981.

Turnaround

Private consumption, housing construction, and municipal investments also are expected to drop more rapidly than in 1981 and public consumption is expected to increase less.

Wirten's belief in a turnaround by the GNP from a 0.9 percent decrease in 1981 to a 1.4 percent (1.0 percent in the January prediction) increase is based, in addition to exports, primarily on increased state investments. They are now expected to increase by 14 percent, compared to 3.4 percent in the January predictions and a 7.7 percent decrease last year.

The turnaround in state investments is clearly the most striking feature of the new economic balance for 1982. It is undeniably startling in a policy that is purported to concentrate on competition abroad and expansion based on exports.

To be sure, the predicted trade balance would provide a continued decrease in the 1982 deficit from 15.7 to 14.4 billion. Thus, the deficit would be lower than the net Swedish interest payments on foreign loans. A benevolent interpretation of this circumstance would be that we are restoring the balance in "new" dealings abroad and must suffer the consequences "only" for our past sins.

But all the calculations--as well as the 1983 figures, which are positive without exception--are based on two prerequisites: a strong improvement in the international economic situation later in 1982 and 1983 and restraint by Swedish industry so that it does not consume all the fruits of last fall's devaluation of the krona, but rather retains the competitive advantages gained by the devaluation.

The economic upturn still exists only in the realm of expectations. Experience from previous devaluations, mildly stated, is not exactly rosy.

Economic Balance for 1981 - 1983

Percentage Change in Volume

	Billion kr. Current prices 1981	Change in Volume		
		1981 prelim.	1982 predict.	1983 predict.
GNP	569.6	-0.9	1.4	2.4
Imports, goods and services	176.6	-4.2	1.4	4.7
Supply	746.2	-1.6	1.4	2.9
Gross investments	109.3	-5.6	-3.0	2.4
Business	48.7	-7.5	-3.8	6.7
Industrial sector				
of business	18.1	-8.4	-11.3	10.0
State authorities	12.2	-7.7	14.0	4.4
Municipalities	21.8	-0.7	-5.3	-4.8
Housing	26.6	-4.2	-9.2	-2.6
Inventory investments ¹	-4.2	-1.8	0.7	0.3
Private consumption	296.6	-0.6	-1.0	1.0
Public consumption	169.6	1.9	1.1	-0.1
State	51.3	-0.5	-2.4	-2.5
Municipal	118.3	3.0	2.7	1.0
Domestic demand	571.3	-2.7	0.0	1.2
Exports, goods and services	174.9	1.6	5.7	7.5
Demand	746.2	-1.6	1.4	2.9

¹Change in inventories in percentage of previous year's GNP.

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CSO 3109/154

NEW LAWS PROPOSED ON STATUS OF BRUSSELS

Francophone Democratic Front Spokesman

Brussels LE SOIR in French 26 Apr 82 pp 1,2

[Commentary by Andre Lagasse, senator of the Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers-Walloon Rally faction: "A Test of Sincerity"]

[Text] Brussels is one of the three regions which make up Belgium: everybody knows it, as it is solemnly stated in... the constitution, and has been for nearly 12 years!

And for nearly 12 years, Brussels has been illegally deprived of the institutions which characterize a region, everybody knows that too.

It has been delivered into the hands of the central authorities of the Belgo-Flemish government -- and consequently, every day the inhabitants of Brussels are plunged a little more into stagnation.

What is referred to as the "Brussels regional executive body," does not exist, because it does not have the beginning of autonomy and because one only finds shadows there. This was proven by Mrs Goor who, very recently, agreed to sink 4 billion francs in a tunnel on the Boulevard Leopold II in order to make it easier for the commuters coming from Flanders to congest the city, and, even more recently, by Mr Demuyter who capitulated without mincing words before Flemish demands concerning civil servants in Brussels: in defiance of the law, he has just promised a 40/60 distribution... to administer a population of which 85 percent is French speaking. Isn't it this same Mr Demuyter -- shadow of a shadow -- who refuses to explain himself before a meeting of members of parliament from Brussels?

Two years ago, the Council of State expressly warned Mr Martens (that is to say more specifically the Martens III administration, the coalition of the three traditional parties) that the laws organizing the Walloon and Flemish regions on the basis of Article 107d would be unconstitutional if they are not shortly complemented by a law endowing Brussels with the regional institutions which it is due. And yet, today Mr Martens (that is to say the Martens V administration and its liberal allies) is cynically clamoring that he will leave Brussels on ice and that his government will not do anything to get parliament to concern itself with the Brussels region.

Rarely has one witnessed a government ignoring to such an extent the rights of people and the future of 1 million inhabitants. To pay 15 percent of the taxes and in return receive only 8 percent for the operation of the municipalities... and 1 percent of the aid to industries: in what civilized country does one find such an injustice?

So the moment has come, for everyone, to explain himself.

Today, the bill introduced in the Senate by the FDF [Democratic Front of Brussels French Speakers] provides the opportunity -- and even the obligation -- to do so: to the Flemish parties but also to the francophone parties. This initiative is a question addressed to all politicians and it should be understood as a formal demand: yes or no, are you going to continue to ignore our fundamental law? To continue to allow the crushing of Brussels by those who turn it into a territory of the kingdom?

-- If you are the least bit concerned with the right to and the respect for freedom, make sure that the proposal is listed at the top of the agenda for the Committee for Revision of the Institutions; accept the debates and the fact that before the summer Brussels must receive the means to rule and administer itself.

-- If, on the contrary, you persist in your attitude of refusal, at least have the courage to contest the consideration of this proposal, stop pretending and cheating, admit to the population of Brussels that the Martens III administration has laughed at it, that it never had the intention of respecting the constitution and that the Martens V administration will continue the destruction of the economic fabric of Brussels and the financial suffocation of the Brussels municipalities.

Our proposal is a basis for discussion; it is the only one up to now; it should allow the legislators to get moving. It defines the territory of the central region and, taking into account the wishes of the inhabitants as they were expressed in large numbers during the consultations organized a year ago by the municipalities, it provides democratic institutions and serious authorities.

The party of Mr Deprez, that of Mr Spitaels, and even that presided over by Mr Michel, aren't they ready today to start the discussion?

Perhaps people will say: "But the Flemish will not want to, and a two-thirds majority is needed in parliament!" Indeed, this is the language of those who are always ready to bow their heads. In fact, a political will on the part of the francophones, a resolute, fiercely resolute will... is the only language that some people are willing to listen to. It would be wrong to lose sight of the following: today, the French community is endowed with its legislative authority and its executive body, and 85 percent of Brussels is one of the two components of this community. And within the community assembly, a political majority has already taken shape and asserted itself at the present time... a majority which is not that of the Martens V administration.

Views of Socialist Moureaux

Brussels LE SOIR in French 26 Apr 82 p 2

[Article by C.-L. B.: "A Bill From Philippe Moureaux: Socialist Views for the Brussels Region"]

[Text] The bill just signed and introduced in the Chamber by Representative Philippe Moureaux, also minister and president of the executive body of the French community, represents, after a rather lengthy period of thinking, the views of the socialists in the capital: "Special bill relative to the Brussels region."

Several provisions of this text are original compared to other proposals already made public. They are also destined to produce reactions in Flemish circles.

In brief, the characteristics to be remembered are the following: guarantees would be provided for the least numerous community; an "alarm bell" could operate; the Council committees would include representatives from each linguistic group; the executive body (five members) would include one Flemish, and each of the members would have definitive and effective responsibilities; the president and vice president would belong to different linguistic groups; the borders of the region would go beyond the 19 municipalities; a rather special system of administrative residence would be set up; all personalized matters pertaining to the two communities would at least be taken up again.

It can be read in the preliminary developments that, "if the Council of State agreed at one time that the three regions provided by Article 107d of the constitution need not be created at the same time, it was subject to the qualification that the Brussels region would be developed within a reasonable period of time."

But, "as the government has already stated that it does not intend to take any initiative in the matter prior to the municipal elections of October 1982, it is up to parliamentary initiative to offset this legally and politically unacceptable shortcoming."

Thus, "the present proposal is aimed at creating the Brussels region and at placing it on an equal footing with the other two regions. It will make it possible both to ensure respect for the principle of equality, which is basic in our law, and to give the inhabitants of Brussels the opportunity to apply their own solutions to their particular economic problems."

Without Time Limitation

As for the territory of the Brussels region, it consists of the 19 municipalities of the current administrative district of Brussels-capital and of the 6

border municipalities referred to as "municipalities with language facilities" In addition, other municipalities from the district of Brussels-Hal-Vilvorde will also become part of that region if their inhabitants so desire (these are the municipalities, as they existed before the 1975 mergers, which will be considered for a possible re-unification).

The bilingual system, as it is currently applied in the 19 municipalities, will be extended to the whole region. On the other hand, those municipalities within the Brussels-Hal-Vilvorde district which will not become part of the region, as well as the municipality of Tervueren, will continue to be part of the Flemish language region.

However, the inhabitants of these municipalities will be granted the right, without time limit, to select their administrative residence in one of these municipalities and will consequently be able to use the language of their choice in all their contacts with the public services. This selection of residence is without any consequence in electoral matters.

End of Agglomeration

The Brussels region will have the same authority as the other two regions. And, in addition: those matters pertaining to both communities which can be personalized; the paid transportation of individuals.

The Brussels regional council will consist of the members of the French and Dutch language groups in the Chamber and the Senate, elected directly and residing within the region.

Guarantees will be granted to the linguistic minority. That is to say: the president and vice president will belong to different language groups; each language group will be represented in the committees; an "alarm bell" procedure, such as the one which exists in the national parliament, will be provided.

The Brussels regional executive body will consist of five members, one of which will belong to the less numerous language group, elected by each language group in the Council. Each member of the executive body will have effective responsibilities and will keep these until the end of his mandate. (Editors' note: Which excludes situations such as aldermen without responsibilities, as we have seen within the Brussels agglomeration, when these responsibilities were withdrawn at the fancy of political evolution.)

Indeed, as far as the author of the proposal is concerned, there is no longer any justification for maintaining the Brussels agglomeration. Those of its authorities which pertain to regional matters will naturally be exercised by the region. The others will be transferred to the municipalities, which will exercise them alone or in association.

Finally, another bill will be introduced. As for the other regions, it will include measures which do not need to be voted on by special majority, and specifically those relative to the financial means which will have to correspond to the specific needs of the Brussels region.

PEACE MOVEMENT SUFFERING FUNDS SHORTAGE AFTER 'SPY' AFFAIR

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Apr 82 p 4

[Article by Jens Thomsen]

[Text] The most prominent Danish peace organization, the Cooperative Committee for Peace and Security, is in financial distress with a deficit of 60,000 kroner. In an appeal from principal Soren Brogaard of Aurehoj High School, the Cooperative Committee is asking all Danish high school and vocational students and their teachers today for cash contributions for future propaganda activity under the guidelines drawn up by the committee.

In the letter to high schools and vocational schools, principal Soren Brogaard explains the reason for the acute economic problems:

"The spy author was not a real spy after all. The foreign minister violated the constitution. The justice minister made a mess of the penal code paragraph. What is left is the peace movement, the real target of all this. They were aiming in particular at the Cooperative Committee for Peace and Security.

Money That Causes Harm

"The Cooperative Committee noted an economic backlash last November and December and is now short around 60,000 kroner."

In the letter to high school students and teachers, principal Soren Brogaard charged that national authorities "in staging the espionage drama used an estimated 15 million kroner for the police intelligence service--money detrimental to Denmark. The Defense Information and Welfare Service uses at least another 15 million kroner a year on propaganda for armaments and nuclear weapons--things that are detrimental to peace."

Principal Brogaard's suggestion to the high schools and vocational schools is that each teacher give 50 kroner and each student 5 kroner to the Cooperative Committee's activity, which is aimed primarily at making the Nordic region an atomic-free zone that is recognized officially by superpowers in the East and in the West.

Soviet Rejection

The letter also includes a Norwegian treaty draft for an atomic-free Nordic zone, a plan that has been rejected by the Soviets. According to SVENSKA DAGBLADET, the Soviet expert on superpower relations, Georgiy Arbatov, said in an interview with TT that "the Nordic region cannot become a totally nuclear-free zone due to the Soviet Union's strategic facilities in the northern section."

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JORGENSEN ATTACKED BY RIGHT AND LEFT OVER SPY-CASE HANDLING

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Apr 82 p 4

[Article by Jorn Mikkelsen]

[Text] Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen had to appear during the question-and-answer period in Folketing in a spirited defense of his minister of justice. A broad cross-section of parties expressed strong dissatisfaction with the way in which Ole Espersen dealt with the spy case against author Arne Herlov Petersen.

It was the justice minister's decision to drop espionage charges under the so-called "mild" espionage paragraph 108 and his subsequent 5-page report on this decision that aroused the anger of both nonsocialist and left-wing parties.

SF [Socialist People's Party] chairman Gert Petersen said this: "With this report the justice minister grossly violates the principle that everyone is innocent until his guilt has been proven in a court of law. I have no doubt that Ole Espersen is legally correct in acting as he has done, but in reality he is violating an established democratic principle."

Conservative Hagen Hagensen fully concurred with this criticism. He said the most problematical element is that Ole Espersen expressed himself on the guilt issue after the charges were dropped. This should be clarified in a court trial according to Hagen Hagensen, who went on:

"Why has the justice minister broken with all principles to publish a report on dropped charges? For the sake of Arne Herlov Petersen as well as the public, this case should have ended in a court case."

Preben Wilhjelm of VS [Left-Socialists] and Gert Petersen wanted a clear answer from the prime minister as to why the espionage charges were dropped. The prime minister did not give a clear answer but referred to the justice minister's report and went on to say:

"Every year from 2000 to 3000 charges are dropped. It is the clear right of the justice minister to conclude a case by dropping charges. It is implicit

in such a decision that the accused could have been convicted. The decision to drop the charges against Arne Herlov Petersen was that of the entire government, including myself."

Anker Jorgensen also said that the government issued a report in anticipation of charges of secretiveness and he said the decision was based on the public prosecutor's recommendation. But in the event of a compensation suit, all the material could be presented to Arne Herlov Petersen and his lawyer.

Several parties said after the debate that the public had still not been told why the charges were dropped. But there was general satisfaction that Arne Herlov Petersen is now free to file a compensation claim.

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SDP FOLKETING MEMBERS SEEN EAGER TO AVOID EARLY ELECTION

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 6 May 82 Sec II p 1

[Commentary by Solveig Rodsgaard]

[Text] The Social Democrats are speculating out loud. But members of the Folketing group are advising each other against an election to save the nation's economy and they will go a long way to stay in power and avoid a direct confrontation in the near future.

The Social Democratic Folketing group will do a lot to avoid a parliamentary election if the government bogs down in its talks with the Radical Liberals and SF [Socialist People's Party]. Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen may continue to threaten the two parties with a nonsocialist government if the talks break down. But it would happen without an election. The realistic members of the Social Democratic Folketing group--and they are the vast majority--are well aware that the Social Democrats would just get one more beating from the voters if they summon them to the polls again.

Many Social Democrats would go even further to steer a safe course prior to the summer recess. They would try to gain passage for the youth employment plan and postpone the problems with the economy until the fall.

Social Democratic organizational vice chairman Inge Fischer Moller said there is not much time in which to gain passage before the summer recess of a "total package dealing with both employment and finances."

"Personally I feel we must take care of youthful employment before the summer recess because we have a responsibility toward the 30-40,000 young people who will be coming out of school this summer. Their lives are at stake. It does not do much good to tell them to wait until the fall. Therefore I think it would be tactically wise and really sensible to decide to pass the youthful employment proposals now and draft a declaration of intent with regard to the economic proposals. But it would have to be a declaration of intent that is binding for the parties involved. For it is quite clear that the proposals to give young people jobs will cost money and the funds must be found. But by and large, hasty decisions concerning the economy are never sensible.

Therefore I do not think it would be wrong to wait and present the bill to the public later. For in a declaration of intent one can easily present the main lines so that the public can adjust itself to the situation."

Inge Fischer Moller hopes the proposals can be implemented with the help of the Radical Liberals and SF, "but with the help of other parties too. For it is never sensible to carry out things that are so extensive in scope and so vitally important with a very narrow majority."

No Election

If the government bogs down, Inge Fischer Moller thinks it should resign without calling a new election. "Then it will be time for the others to show what they can do. But that must happen without an election. An election would not serve anyone's interests."

Inge Fischer Moller was one of the leading Social Democrats who wanted the party to pass into the opposition after the December election. "But I have accepted the decision of the majority and have acted accordingly now that we are in the government. Therefore I hope we can proceed further. And I think there is a 50-50 chance that we can."

Avoid Nonsocialist Government

One of the other Social Democrats--besides the prime minister--who has threatened the Radical Liberals and SF is Lasse Budtz and he is also willing to make do with passing the youth employment measures now, for example, and finding funds to pay for them in the fall. "Perhaps we could make do with a declaration of intent."

But Lasse Budtz also advises against an election. "One cannot ask the voters to go to the polls again so soon after the last election. Yes, I was one of those who recommended that the government continue in December and I still think it was the right course to avoid a nonsocialist government supported by the Progressive Party."

Without naming any names, Lasse Budtz gave his colleague, Jens Risgaard Knudsen, a sharp rap because he said recently that the government would resign within a few days.

"There is nothing to all those rumors that the prime minister wants to throw off the reins. The last thing he wants is to throw off the reins and with them the responsibility borne by the nation's biggest party."

Muddled Waters

Others are also annoyed with Risgaard Knudsen and with group secretary Jytte Andersen who has talked about a Folketing election. Member of the Social Democratic group committee and former minister Egon Jensen said:

"We have no use for an election. We need results and concrete stands on what can be done about the youth employment situation. And if more of my group colleagues would remember the old saw about speech being silver while silence is golden and not the other way around, a great deal would be gained. There is no reason in the current political situation to muddy the waters by behaving like 'election experts.' And when it comes to the point, I think we will gain support for the government's plan, perhaps with moderate changes."

Social Democratic Song

Thus many Social Democrats would go a long way to stay in power and avoid a direct confrontation in the near future. SF, which is holding a national congress this weekend, can keep that in mind and so can the Radical Liberals, whose plans for an income policy intervention were rejected by the government. Perhaps the two parties should also look at the song recently composed for the Social Democratic group party. To the melody of "How Fair the Smile of the Danish Coast," one of the verses goes like this:

"In March we got a package from Svend: 'Now the young people must have something to do.' It is a clever cabinet trick; the people themselves must pay for Auken's gift. If it does not work, we will have a hard time and only SF can lean back and relax."

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FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES WAR FEAR, ECONOMY, EC, POLITICS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 23 Apr 82 Supplement pp 2-5

[Interview with Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen by Victor Andersen and Niels Norlund; date and place not given]

[Text] In the past it was problems close at hand that determined Danish foreign and security policy. But today there are currents running across the old geographical divisions which have introduced a new dimension into Danish foreign policy, according to Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen in this interview. He also reviews a number of the most important problems confronting Denmark today just when we are on the point of taking over the EC chairmanship and at a time when fear of war and the economic crisis are becoming pronounced.

Victor Andersen, a journalist with a degree in political science, has been on the staff of the weekend edition of BERLINGSKE AFTEN since 1979, specializing in economics, politics and EC affairs. From 1944 to 1969 he worked for FINANSTIDENDE, BORSEN, DAGENS NYHEDER and POLITIKEN. Editorial writer and commentator for BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 1969-79.

Niels Norlund has been a member of the chief editorial staff of the Berlingske publication group since 1970. Responsible editor of BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, 1967-70. Correspondent for BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Berlin, London, New York and Washington in the period 1946-54 and associated with BERLINGSKE AFTENAVIS as foreign policy writer. Author of "The Fight for Germany," "The World Since 1945" and "When War Came," among other things.

[Question] You have been foreign minister for more than 2 years. What are your thoughts on Denmark's foreign policy? What are your intentions and your tasks?

[Answer] The primary task of Danish foreign policy is to safeguard Danish interests. Danish foreign policy should seek to preserve Danish independence as well as develop and promote Danish interests with reference to our trade and our entire economy. But the world has changed since the traditional view of Danish foreign and security policy was formulated. In a global context, countries are linked more closely together. The United Nations is an expression of this and we are seeing more and more concentration in regional co-operation. We also see how things that were once regarded as irrelevant to us have moved much closer today. For example, I was in Southeast Asia last month and had talks with colleagues in India, Thailand and Indonesia. The last two countries are members of ASEAN and the entire development in that area means a lot to Denmark in terms of our trade with them. The boundaries of our interests have broadened considerably. That is an important difference from the way things used to be.

Another difference I feel is striking is that tensions in the world have changed in character in the sense that there are currents running across former geographical divisions. New dimensions have entered into the way we look at problems in East-West relations. In the past, and here I mean after World War II, we were concerned with matters in our immediate vicinity. There was a very big discussion when we joined NATO, but it was kept below a certain level with regard to involvement and intensity.

Today, East-West problems no longer stand alone; they must be viewed in the context of North-South problems. Thus Danish foreign and security policy has become a very broadly defined task. Our foreign policy sphere is not just our immediate geographical vicinity but extends much further. Therefore a new definition in Danish foreign policy is that together with countries that share our views, we must try to influence developments on a more global level.

[Question] But you are still most concerned with the nearby problems?

[Answer] Obviously. It is also in the immediate area that we have expanded--namely in relation to Europe--and we have gained influence.

But if you compare this with the situation as it was not too long ago, not many people would have felt that cooperation with Greece was one of our immediate problems. It has become so through EC.

More Than in EC

[Question] Is there one of your predecessors, H. C. Hansen, Krag, Haekkerup, K. B. Andersen, you view as a model?

[Answer] I will not single anyone out. As a young politician I had a chance to work with all of them. Two of them had great analytical talents and two of them were foreign ministers with a sense of proportion. As Per Haekkerup said, for example: "For a little country like Denmark that must safeguard its interests, create international influence for itself and pursue a foreign

policy, it is a question of analysis and of timing and of the weight of the arguments." These words are very important and correct and they still apply.

[Question] Is there a difference between Danish foreign policy and Social Democratic foreign policy?

[Answer] There is no essential difference. I have viewed it as my task, as a member of a minority government, to maintain the breadth that has been behind Danish foreign and security policy for many years. Recent Folketing debates show that we have that breadth. It is very important when Denmark has to speak to the outside world. But the question concerns whether there can be differences and to that I would say that there can be differences in nuances. And that is the way it should be--as long as the basic principles are in order. There can be a difference with regard to how much we become involved in one thing or another.

[Question] Would you have a different opinion if you were foreign minister in a solid Social Democratic majority government?

[Answer] No. I cannot point to any examples of things I would have done differently if we had had a Social Democratic majority government, but when we talk of nuances, I have made some statements on the entire nuclear arms build-up that have not been received with undivided joy in the western countries and it is conceivable that politicians from other parties might think that "we should not concentrate so much on that, it could help to weaken our political credit." It is my opinion that Denmark should also take part in the dialogue.

[Question] With regard to nuances. One can note a shade of difference at any rate in what you say when you come from an EC meeting and what your prime minister says when he comes from Socialist International meetings. It is as if he pursues a more Social Democratic foreign policy than you do.

[Answer] Then you must explain what the difference consists of.

[Question] We have three pertinent examples of times when he went farther than you would go directly. There was his statement on the Nordic region last summer, on the Nordic region as a nuclear-free zone. There was his very obvious criticism of Reagan's Central American policy recently. There was his endorsement or recognition of Brezhnev's recent moratorium. Here one could detect more restraint on your part.

[Answer] We cannot express ourselves in a completely identical way, but with regard to the three examples I can quickly show that in substance we have spoken in complete agreement on a Nordic nuclear-free zone with reference to the prerequisites for talking about the Nordic region as a nuclear-free zone, that others must be included, that it must be viewed in a broader context. There is no difference at all here. With regard to El Salvador, I have, for example, supported the Mexican-French statement that pointed out the necessity of including all sides in a political solution. The prime minister has

said the same thing. With regard to Brezhnev's moratorium, Anker Jorgensen welcomed it. It was a repetition of a proposal Brezhnev came up with earlier and I said then that I viewed it positively. The statements made by me and by the prime minister are not far from what Helmut Schmidt says, for example, when he talks about a gesture or from what the Dutch foreign minister has said. The important thing is that there was no difference in substance.

[Question] Do you agree on what to say each time, you and Anker Jorgensen?

[Answer] Sometimes we do, sometimes we don't. I travel quite a bit and then the prime minister is acting foreign minister and it is not always possible to get in touch with each other.

[Question] But do you feel you are in close harmony?

[Answer] Yes, we do because we do discuss things, you know. The choice of words is not as important as the substance.

[Question] On the moratorium question, you made comparisons with Germany and Holland. But their foreign policy led to Denmark and Greece taking a separate stand on the matter in the nuclear planning group at the NATO meeting in Colorado. If there is no real difference of opinion, what is the purpose of isolating Denmark within the alliances, as you did there? And as you did for a long time with regard to the symbolic sanctions against the Soviet Union?

[Answer] It is not proper to talk about these matters at nuclear planning meetings and a short time before we will have a NATO meeting. It is no use issuing some statement or another every time we meet within NATO, whether it is the nuclear planning group, the defense ministers or the security conference group. We have a communiqué from the last NATO council meeting and we will hold a meeting next month. The best thing would be for us to evaluate things together and then issue a statement next month. In short, it does no good for the foreign ministers to say one thing and the defense ministers another. That is our main argument.

[Question] Then it was simply a procedural matter?

[Answer] Simply procedural. But I will not conceal the fact that there were inappropriate phrases in what was planned. We have said concerning Brezhnev's statement on the moratorium that we view it as a positive political signal. Previously it was a question of a total standstill. The content of the moratorium proposal is not an acceptable solution. However, we hold the basic view that the American proposal for a zero solution under which the SS-20 missiles would be destroyed and the older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles would be phased out is also a preliminary move toward discussions and it is in Geneva that these things must be tested when the parties sit across from each other. Therefore one should not be totally negative in one's statements when Brezhnev after a long period of silence seems to open up, even though the content of his proposal is no solution.

[Question] Wouldn't it have been more of a signal if the moratorium had come in 1979 when NATO made its double decision on meeting procedures and negotiations, instead of waiting until the 300 SS-20 missiles were in place?

[Answer] Yes, of course.

[Question] At that time, you yourself proposed a 6-month moratorium on the NATO decision. Is that a proposal you still recall with satisfaction?

[Answer] I am still glad I presented it and I am sorry it did not go through in NATO. It was based on postponing the decision on principle for 6 months, with the idea that within those 6 months the Soviet Union would have a chance to say that it had halted production of the SS-20 and was ready for immediate negotiations. What made it so difficult for me was that the meeting took place such a short time after I had assumed my post as foreign minister. In other words, I did not have the time to do the preliminary work that was needed. I have since met colleagues who thought it was really quite a good idea. That is because it contained two possibilities. One was that the Soviet Union would say all right, we are ready to do this. The other was that if Moscow said no, NATO would have stood in an entirely different and psychologically advantageous situation.

[Question] Was there--or has there been since--anything to suggest that the Soviet Union would react positively to it or would you have had to wait until the next 250 missiles were in place?

[Answer] We can only theorize. We can establish that since December 1979 a great many SS-20 missiles have been put in place. Today it is estimated that the Soviet Union has 300 of them in all--200 aimed at western, i.e. European targets. That is a very very disturbing development and there can be no doubt that it gives the Soviet Union a clear superiority in the area of what some people call Eurostrategic weapons.

[Question] Do you feel hopeful about the chances that the Geneva talks will lead to results?

[Answer] If I express myself very optimistically, the first reaction will be that "you have totally lost touch with reality." On the basis of the statements that have been made and what we have seen of negotiations to date, the indications are that it will be a very protracted process with very limited chances of reaching concrete results. But on the other hand, I also feel there are factors that point in the other direction. First of all, there is the time factor, since it is clear that the first western missiles cannot be in position until the end of 1983. Not one has been set up yet, because they are still in the process of being developed and produced. In the second place, there is a mounting realization that we cannot just allow this spiral to continue. Personally I have the feeling that it would be too primitive if we base our negotiations on sitting down and counting with mathematical precision how many they have--and how many we have. We have a

nuclear potential on both sides that is many times what is necessary to destroy us.

Where Are Decisions Made?

[Question] To return to the question of relations between the foreign minister and the chief of state, this time in a European context. Haven't the European summit meetings introduced a complication into the foreign policy decision-making process in the sense that there sit the heads of government behind closed doors on their own, making decisions, while the foreign ministers with their expertise walk around outside, unable to get in?

[Answer] That is not the way it is. We sit inside.

[Question] While all the talks are going on?

[Answer] Things have developed. I have just read a very interesting item from one of my good colleagues who has gone through the entire development of the European Council. Originally it was not called the European Council, of course. People gathered informally without papers and bureaucracy and all that. Then at some point it was decided to hold such meetings three times a year. Then there has been an unfortunate tendency for bureaucracy to enter into the picture because each government leader comes to the meetings with a large delegation. We have quite deliberately cut down on that. The fact is that government leaders and foreign ministers, but no one else, attend the entire meeting. At dinnertime, the government leaders usually go into one room and foreign ministers into another. They usually meet for coffee and inform each other concerning what has happened.

[Question] Where are the decisions made--during the fish course, during the meat course or over coffee?

[Answer] It depends on how many problems there are. If there are not many, we wait until we have had a good talk and a good mood has been created, but otherwise things can start at a very early point. Yes--decisions and decisions. Many times we just exchange viewpoints and discuss matters. No notes are taken. The only people allowed in are four or five interpreters and they have no papers and all that.

[Question] At the last summit meeting, Denmark would have dearly liked to do something about youthful unemployment and getting the motors running again in the economic policies of all EC countries. The first thing Anker Jorgensen said after returning home was that we would have a new tax package. How does that go together with our wanting all of Europe to expand while we ourselves have to cut down?

[Answer] What Anker Jorgensen was leading up to is that other countries must do the same as Denmark. He did not put it that way, but when he talked about the need for everyone, preferably in a coordinated way, making an effort in the form of investing money to combat unemployment, it was because if one

country forged ahead other countries did nothing at all, the country in question would suffer economically. Therefore it is good there was a general understanding around the table and for that reason we can safely go ahead with what we planned. It is obvious that one cannot make concrete decisions involving specific figures on such an occasion, but it was decided to follow this up with concrete proposals that will then be discussed further later on.

[Question] But is it hoped that what will happen in the other nine lands will be expansive? As far as we can judge, the March package is neutral.

[Answer] No, but the March package is only one part, you know. The European Council decided to invest to combat unemployment, to invest in public initiatives. The energy sector was mentioned specifically as well as the need to invest in vital industrial renewal. We must also keep up with technological developments if we want to avoid very big problems. Many emphasize concentrating on the contribution of smaller enterprises. This is especially true of the other countries. The huge mastodons have a hard time due to lack of flexibility and inability to make changes.

Denmark's Intentions in Chairmanship Period

[Question] How are you preparing yourself for the Danish EC chairmanship period this fall?

[Answer] We are taking over the chairmanship at a time when EC has the biggest problems it has had since it came into the world. As chairman we must contend with that. By the end of the year it is estimated that unemployment will be up around 12 million. Because of the economic crisis, protectionism is lurking in the EC cooperation. If that development is allowed to continue it could threaten the very basis for EC. Namely joint policies. It would mean a competition that could easily reinforce the trend. There are many individual areas under the heading of economic problems. The foreign exchange area, for example, and joint agricultural policy, an area we are very interested in. Fishing also plays a quite important role for us. These are problems we will try to solve and I hope we manage to do so. In the background is the large problem of restructuring. This stems from the British budget problems, but that is only part of the entire set of tasks for EC in the mandate of 30 May. This was arrived at on 30 May 1980 after endless meetings and negotiations. In this mandate, EC insured a politically-determined payment to Great Britain for 1980 and 1981. At the same time the Commission was asked to come up with a plan by June 1981 that would outline how to deal with things in 1982 and what should be done in many other areas in order to arrive at a joint policy. The Commission did produce such a plan, but it does not entirely meet the terms of the 30 May mandate. The discussion we have had since then has reflected how complex matters are.

[Question] Will it be more expensive to be a member of EC when Denmark is in charge of presenting the 1983 budget?

[Answer] Hardly! When EC is expanded to include Portugal and Spain, the question may arise, but that is not just around the corner.

Is Veto Right on the Way Out?

[Question] On the anniversary of EC, both Gaston Thorn and Peter Dankert, the new chairman of the parliament, suggested that the Treaty of Rome should be revised. Countries should be kept from using the veto right on what is called the trivia department. We have also let the veto right slide somewhat in the sanctions against the Soviet Union. Is the Danish government moving away from the veto right?

[Answer] No, I do not think the sanctions issue, Article 113, which is what is involved, has anything to do with our letting the veto right slide. On the contrary. We could have allowed ourselves to be voted down and said we did not consider this important. We still think the veto right should be maintained. The question that can be asked is whether one should resort to the veto right each time. There are things that are important and things that are less important. The idea of the veto right is that each country can say that it finds this or that question so vital to its interests that it wants to make use of the veto right.

[Question] Why would Denmark prefer to have the Treaty of Rome remain as it is?

[Answer] Those who want to change the Treaty of Rome base it on a desire to move toward more flexible forms of cooperation. But that is not the real problem. The main thing is that at the moment we have a basis for EC, namely the Treaty of Rome. We have institutions that are excellent instruments for cooperating within EC. The main problem is that we have a hard time creating results within EC. They can come up with a European Treaty or they can make changes in the Treaty of Rome. That will not change the fact that at the moment there are a number of problems that cannot be solved by simply revising the treaty. Therefore we have said all along and will continue to say that success in EC cooperation must be measured by the results achieved.

[Question] Do you see any prospect that the cooperation will make any headway within the existing framework?

[Answer] Yes. The framework has not been filled out at all. What is needed is the requisite dynamism to fill it out. I hope this will happen.

[Question] Can we help this to happen?

[Answer] We must not overestimate the prospects. When one is chairman, one has a special responsibility and to some extent one must move outside one's own framework and try to find common denominators for the different problems. But we have seen how hard it has been for the Belgian and British chairmen. The difficulty for us is that the problems have become worse since then. It

sounds as if I am very pessimistic. I am not. But now that we are taking over the chairmanship, I do so with full awareness that there really are problems and that some of them have become tied up in knots.

[Question] Will there be a conflict between virtue and predilection on your part with regard to being more European and less Danish?

[Answer] Even though one is chairman, Danish interests must be safeguarded. That is obvious, but it gives an extra dimension that one also has obligations to try and act as arbitrator on the issues dividing us today. You said virtue or predilection. These would not necessarily come in conflict with each other. The thing that has been harmful to Denmark historically and in the EC context today is the inability of the great powers to agree. When Germany, France and Great Britain can arrive at solutions, these will not be solutions harmful to us. Whether you take the agricultural sector, financing the budget or some other area.

[Question] Isn't the mood of the people lacking in all that? There is quite a large degree of Danish skepticism concerning EC cooperation.

[Answer] That is also true in other EC lands. In Belgium the steel miners [as published] went on strike and farmers in many countries have also demonstrated. For me there is no doubt at all that if we had not had EC and each country had to stand in isolation in some kind of loose EFTA context, the problems and conflicts would have been considerably more pronounced than what we are seeing now. EC has shown real progress when it comes to political cooperation in recent years. It has been very positive for me to be part of things during these 2 1/2 years and to see how things have developed. For reasons we touched on in the beginning, the international dialogue has often been left to the superpowers. What we have demonstrated with the political cooperation is not turned against the United States, but I see it as a valuable contribution to bring out important nuances when there is often a tendency to present things as either black or white.

Officials in EC

[Question] Why does the Danish government do so little to get Danish officials placed in the EC machinery?

[Answer] Actually we do a lot. On the domestic level, circulars have been sent on several occasions to the ministries and agencies, emphasizing the necessity of having as many people down there as possible. I would like to see more interest in going down there for a few years and working for EC.

[Question] Then there is a misconception in EC. For there they definitely have the impression that Danish officials do not have the support of their government when they go there and they are also unsure whether they will have a permanent job when they come home.

[Answer] No. It has been established with the Finance Ministry that Danish officials that go to EC and then return will not suffer from having been away. In other words, they must have the assurances needed. We agree on that principle.

[Question] And you see it as an advantage that we have people down there who are familiar with things from the inside?

[Answer] Definitely.

On Greenland--No Secession from Denmark

[Answer] As the next chairman of EC, you will be receiving a delegation from your own country concerning the future of Greenland. How will you handle that?

[Answer] I do not think that would be the most difficult problem I might encounter.

[Question] You will decide in your own favor?

[Answer] That will not be a big problem. An agreement in principle has been reached in Godthab to follow the result of the popular referendum and now we are being asked to proceed further with this. This means that I will make a formal announcement to Folketing and give a report. Then we will present it to EC, to the Council, the Commission, and then an amendment to the Treaty of Rome must be drafted so that things fall into place. Then negotiations must be started concerning what agreements Greenland can arrive at with EC, but when it comes to procedure, I do not foresee any complications. I am quite sure the other nine lands will respect this.

[Question] Will it be possible to conclude the negotiations within EC before the election in Greenland at the end of the year?

[Answer] I definitely think so.

[Question] So that the eventual solution can be presented to the voters of Greenland?

[Answer] The formalities must be dealt with before one can go into the practical talks about what Greenland's status in relation to EC will be. The two things cannot be dealt with simultaneously. Obviously EC cannot draft an agreement before it is settled that Greenland is no longer a member.

[Question] In other words, Greenland will not know the conditions before it has withdrawn?

[Answer] No, it will not. One does not need to be so formal, one can easily have contacts enabling one to form an impression of the main features of the

way things are heading. It is a matter of making bilateral contacts and forming that kind of picture.

[Question] But the Danish government would be inclined on that basis to give the people of Greenland a clearer idea of what things will be like than was the case before the referendum.

[Answer] It could not have been stated more clearly last time. We said that they could not count on the present systems simply continuing with regard to the regional fund and many other revenues Greenland has received. We cannot say anything about what else might be agreed to. Another thing that will keep them from getting to the end of the road before things are cleared up is that Greenland would like to enter into a so-called OLT arrangement, standing for Overseas Lands and Territories.

It is in that context that things must be handled for Greenland. What lies ahead is a purely formal process. If that is adhered to, Greenland would be able to leave EC on 1 January 1984. At that point, it will be possible to go a long way in contacts and negotiations, but it will not be the end of the road.

[Question] As you know, the government kept a low profile prior to the popular referendum in Greenland, although EC supporters in Greenland asked it to prepare a white paper, etc. But the prime minister told Folketing that this would not be done. Did you regret afterwards, considering how narrow the margin was, that you did not do a little more in the debate there?

[Answer] No, I have answered many questions in the Market Committee from Greenlanders opposed as well as from Greenlanders who favored EC. These questions or my replies have become part of the debate in Greenland. There was ample opportunity to clear up many of the problems, but I feel it is wrong in principle for the government to intervene on behalf of one side or the other. But we have been willing all along to give purely factual information about things.

[Question] Would you also keep such a low profile if the home-rule idea is replaced with the idea of autonomous rule?

[Answer] That would be different, since that would be in relation to Denmark. This was in relation to EC as such.

[Question] That does not alter our question.

[Answer] I will just say that the opponents made it very clear that this had nothing to do with affiliation with Denmark and therefore the only possible conclusion is that the question is not relevant now nor likely to become so.

On Peace Movements and Fear of the Bomb

[Olesen] It is understandable that so many people react as they do and it is clear that these tendencies are being seen primarily here in the West. I think this contributed to the United States stepping up talks with the Soviet Union last May on INF [expansion unknown] weapons. Lately the movement--I am not referring just to the peace movement, since that is often defined somewhat narrowly, but to the movement we have seen in Europe--has turned up on the other side of the Atlantic. It has crept into congress. The anxiety must be seen in connection with the fact that more and more people are becoming aware that the Soviet Union has already set up the SS-20 missiles. The question is whether the Soviet Union will continue to build up its SS-20 forces. It is my assessment that it will not. At any rate, the Soviet Union has no logical interest in doing so. The Soviets have no interest in having Pershing-2 and cruise missiles set up in West Europe--even though the technology is such that they do not have to be in the places originally designated. On top of that, the Soviet Union has had another unsuccessful harvest. The country has sharply intensifying economic and political problems that should not be underestimated. Take Poland. Take the long border with China. Take Afghanistan, which is obviously an economic and political problem for the Soviet Union. For that matter, take Vietnam when it comes to the economic commitments the Soviet Union has made. Based on what I would call an attempt to make an objective evaluation, there are a great many things that indicate a Soviet interest in achieving concrete results.

[Question] You talk of a mounting realization that the arms race spiral cannot continue. Are you speaking of public opinion or the government's attitude?

[Answer] Both. When one says public opinion, the situation in the past was that it was felt the peace movements were strongly oriented toward the Soviet Union. And it is true that communists in the western countries have infiltrated to a large extent and have initiated and run many peace movements. But what we are experiencing at the moment in the peace movement in Denmark and, in a broader sense, in other countries is not the work of the communists. While I was in Washington on an official visit with Haig, I spent a lot of time explaining what is really going on in Europe, because the Americans did not fully comprehend developments.

[Question] Is it fear?

[Answer] Yes, it is fear. And a not incomprehensible fear of what such weapons are capable of doing.

[Question] But "not incomprehensible" is not the same as "justified," is it? Is it lack of information that is involved?

[Answer] No, those who have political responsibility in the West must have a dialogue, not just with the parliaments that must provide a majority to

support their decisions but with popular tendencies like this as well. I find such popular tendencies important. Problems are approached in other ways than politicians use with their more mathematical approach. This means raising some questions that the responsible politicians are forced to try to answer.

[Question] But a dialogue does not just mean listening to the signals sent out by popular movements, it also involves responding.

[Answer] Yes, but politics is not just information. Politics also involves the irrational factors that lead people to act emotionally. The fact that many people react emotionally against the nuclear arms build-up is not a sign of weakness in the West. If one takes a moment to examine what is involved in the problem and to take a more objective look at this planet, one is forced to say that it is crazy to use so many billions of dollars each year on the nuclear arms race. And on the arms race in general, for conventional armaments cover 80 percent of what is now spent on weapons annually in the world. People say with perfect justice that there is a fantastic imbalance between this and the poverty prevailing in the Third World.

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OLESEN DISCUSSES DANISH ROLE IN EUROPEAN COOPERATION

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 5 May 82 p 5

[Article by Lars Th. Kjolbye]

[Text] European political cooperation is an important element in the international debate and EC lands should not leave it to the superpowers alone to take a stand on foreign policy matters. Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen said this yesterday during a hearing on European political cooperation that was arranged by the Danish European Movement.

Not Hesitant

Kjeld Olesen emphasized that "little Denmark" has a much greater influence over developments than we would have if we were outside the cooperation. In this connection, the foreign minister stressed the great Norwegian interest in the European political cooperation (EPS) that has been established among the 10 EC nations outside the framework of the Treaty of Rome. Kjeld Olesen said that in many ways this cooperation can be compared with Nordic political cooperation. He also said that in this context they had detected some envy on the part of a Nordic ministerial colleague as to the influence Denmark has with regard to the EPS initiatives.

Kjeld Olesen, who on 1 July will take over the chairmanship of the EC Council of Ministers, a post that also covers political cooperation, also commented on the Danish debate on EPS and said there is absolutely no basis for saying that Denmark's participation in the European political cooperation is a relinquishment of sovereignty that exceeds the framework established in connection with Denmark's inclusion in EC. The foreign minister also commented on the discussion last fall concerning the proposal for a permanent secretariat for the political cooperation. Denmark was one of those opposing this proposal and we did not take part in the so-called London statement of October 1981 either, a statement that adjusted the EPS guidelines. "We are not the hesitant Danes who don't dare," Kjeld Olesen said of the opposition, but Denmark feels the cooperation could function better in the present way, with the capital where the chairman resides also providing the secretariat functions. However, the changes made in the fall formalized the cooperation so there is close contact on political cooperation on the part of the past,

present and future chairmen. This means that at the moment Denmark is working with the Belgians, who have the chairmanship now, and the British, who turned the chairmanship over to the Belgians.

During a round by politicians, Conservative member of Folketing Ole Bernt Henriksen said that with the European political cooperation, Denmark had obtained "a set of rights that cannot be taken away from us. In the 1930's Denmark had to negotiate bilaterally and then it was really a question of suspending our sovereignty."

Arne Christiansen (Liberal) deplored the fact that a number of words such as "union" have become taboo in the Danish debate and he regretted that the Danish government had rejected the German-Italian plan for closer political cooperation.

Holger K. Nielsen (Socialist People's Party) stressed that his party does not consist of anti-internationalists and he saw a number of positive possibilities for Europe's role in the North-South dialogue, among other things, but he stressed that a national Danish foreign policy must be maintained in light of the European political cooperation.

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OBSERVER SEES CHANCE FOR SDP, SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S PARTY COALITION

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 5 May 82 p 10

[Commentary by Anders Uhrskov]

[Text] Anders Uhrskov was a member of the Socialist People's Party from 1959 to 1979 and a member of the executive committee and business committee, 1967-76.

A weakened Social Democratic Party, the SF [Socialist People's Party] victory in the November election (with the disengagement of VS [Left-Socialists] and the Danish CP), the political pressure from the grass roots and from LO [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] and the unstable electorate in the new multi-party system all provide a basis for (yet another) labor majority.

Since 1979 there has been a Folketing election every other year. After their nose dive in 1973 and 1975, the Social Democrats together with the left-wing parties have received 47-50 percent of the votes in the last three elections. The political crisis in Denmark has not taken the form of the real conservative wave it has in a number of western countries, but has been expressed in sharply fluctuating voter support for a large number of parties.

Therefore it is realistic to imagine a scenario in which the Social Democrats, SF and VS with North Atlantic support manage to get the 90 seats that spell success in Folketing in one of the elections held in the 1980's.

The Social Democratic-SF majorities in 1966-67 and 1971-73 were transitory, relatively unprepared for and did not represent in political results a break in the lines of development that characterized the period prior to the creation of these labor majorities.

It is praiseworthy that SF is already discussing the conditions needed to get an "effective labor majority" next time.

Nonsocialist Voter Frustration

One of the stated purposes for forming SF was to break the "class cooperation line of the Social Democrats," as it was called.

This succeeded in the sense that the first Social Democratic-SF cooperation in 1966-67 drove the Radical Liberals into the arms of the Liberals and Conservatives--with the VKR [Liberal-Conservative-Radical Liberal] government of 1968-71 as a result.

When the 1971 election led to a new labor majority due to the frustration of nonsocialist voters (VKR had allowed income taxes to shoot up explosively and Glistrup had not yet been discovered as a political right-wing alternative), one could glimpse the outlines of a new political party structure in this country--a two-bloc system pitting the labor parties, S [Social Democrats] and SF against the nonsocialist VKR group.

Election's Best Offer

The political development in which a new two-bloc system seemed to be forming and in which the economy made possible a growth in the public sector that S and SF could agree on, changed abruptly in 1973. Not because of EC membership, but because the Danish party system broke down in the election of 4 December 1973 and because the oil crisis in October and November of that year presaged the international economic market crisis that has hit Denmark especially hard.

The long-term reason for the breaking up of the party system, which was made possible technically by the unusually low 2 percent vote barrier, was the dissolution of the traditional social structures which accelerated during the period of prosperity from 1958 to 1973. The growth of the salaried employee group in particular contributed to the shrinking of the voter core. More and more people became marginal voters who go for "the election's best offer."

The short-term reason for what happened in 1973 was the appearance of alternatives for nonsocialist voters who were frustrated over the VKR tax policy and the labor voters' frustration over the Social Democrats' EC policy.

Two Kinds of Labor Majority

Thus voter conduct is characterized by a lesser degree of party loyalty than was true in the past and by a distribution over more parties. Another feature is that the basis for the election and the course of the campaign, which is typically dominated by top politicians and individual issues, seem to play a larger role at the expense of the parties' general policy and conduct in the period before the election was called.

This is a general feature that has not weakened but has grown stronger in these years. This does not make life easier for a party like SF whose

members--but not necessarily a voter majority--have a goal of radical social change.

The SF "Program of Principles and Action" states:

"But there are two kinds of labor majority. A parliamentary majority of labor parties does not automatically mean that it will be possible to introduce a second phase. It can simply be a 'whim of the voters,' a kind of accident.... We must work for a labor majority that is well-prepared, in other words, the leftist orientation must have taken a strong hold in the labor movement, a strong base movement must have been developed and the left wing must be broadly strengthened--especially its democratic-socialist segment."

The analysis is undoubtedly correct. A Folketing majority can hardly become engaged in a radical leftist-oriented policy in a popular vacuum. It can only be done in harmony with strong popular pressure--but so far, strong popular movements have made themselves felt in only a few instances. Most clearly in connection with the EC referendum.

Grass Roots and LO

It is probably more realistic to discuss an S-SF majority's possibilities and limitations on the basis of the assumption that the popular pressure is unlikely to be much broader than that which the important--but numerically modest--grass-roots movements of the past decade have been able to mobilize.

The union movement--and effectively, this means LO--is the decisive source of pressure in relation to the Social Democrats. The OD [Economic Democracy] proposal may perhaps be taken as an expression both of how far LO can extend itself in the direction of leftist-oriented policies and of how limited a base support LO can mobilize for a fundamental reform proposal.

"The favor of the voters is nothing but thin air," is a saying written on a wall of the Christiansborg lobby. But a majority based on the favor of the voters must also function and it does so best when the conditions are recognized.

The most characteristic feature of the multi-party system we acquired in 1973 is that the parties are weaker than they used to be.

The ability of the parties to take unpopular stands has been reduced by the instability of the voters and at times one has the impression that party switches are determined primarily by what a party has not done or said--SF rather than Anker's real wage policy, Erhard rather than the daily compensation reduction of the VK Overall Plan, etc.

Membership figures have declined in general and the new parties have only modest membership rolls.

Nonsocialist Paralysis

The Social Democrats have formed weak minority governments most of the time. There has been a nonsocialist majority in Folketing since 1973, but it has been largely unusable because you must stretch from the Radical Liberals to the Progressives to arrive at that majority.

This nonsocialist paralysis is the parliamentary background for Anker Jorgensen's various governments.

The Social Democratic governments have had to scrape by and cooperation on economic policy has covered almost all party combinations in turn with the exception of VS and the Progressive Party.

After V, K, CD [Center-Democrats] and KRF [Christian People's Party] raised the possibility of an alternative following the December 1981 election, the Conservatives had to note that the alternative could not be taken at face value. The Social Democrats are still the only possibility.

Distribution of Real Wage Decline

There is a tendency in the political discussion for the left wing to talk about the crisis of capitalism and the 300,000 people who are out of work, while the right wing talks about competitiveness, a foreign debt of over 100 billion kroner and an annual state deficit of 40-50 billion. Both sides may refer to the fact that investments, which were 17 percent of the national product in 1973, were down to 4 percent in 1981.

No one should harbor any illusions that a crisis of the magnitude which has already hit Denmark--and will continue to affect us for the rest of this decade--can be dealt with without both workers and nonworking groups taking their share of the burden.

If nothing else, we will be impoverished through devaluations touched off by the continued weakening of the kronen in the years ahead.

The biggest problem is to distribute the real wage decline so that production is not adversely affected but is benefitted instead and so that the very weak groups are hurt as little as possible.

Weakened Social Democrats

The Social Democrats who may enter into an S-SF majority sometime in the 1980's will be a weakened party--compared to the party of J. O. Krag and Per Haekkerup 10-15 years ago.

With no particular economic growth, there is not much cake to divide up directly and via the state and no sizable funds to divide up via further income equalization through taxation.

The party is weakened in membership figures and age make-up in relation to a strengthened LO which has won "a hell of a victory." The party is obviously split up in wings with a left wing that is not particularly yielding. The party is led by a prime minister and a party leadership who have not laid a very clear course for sailing through the crisis.

A weakened Social Democratic Party can be tactically easier to deal with for possible coalition partners than a strong and self-assured Social Democratic Party. But strategically--with specific reference to the ability to plot out and maintain a long-range policy--the party's weakness is a very deplorable expression of society's general political crisis.

SF Election Victory

Now an election victory normally leads to less self-searching than an election defeat for party psychological reasons, but even so SF should analyze its situation after the election results from 8 December 1981.

Some of the gains undoubtedly can be attributed to the external given factor that the government had pursued such a clumsy economic policy that a number of voters in desperation turned their backs on Anker and put their cross by Gert Petersen's party. It will limit SF's freedom of action if it tries to hold onto the votes that were cast for the party because it was not weighed down by compromises and objective co-responsibility.

VS, Danish CP--and the Slumbering Beasts of Prey

Some of the gains may be due to the fact that by placing the Social Democratic employment plan at the center of its election campaign, SF freed itself from VS and the Danish CP as reference points.

The possibilities for translating some of the gains into political results are strengthened by the fact that the traditional battle in SF between the Folketing group and party congresses, etc. appears to have been overcome, partly, as far as one can see, because the party's representatives have combined campaign rhetoric and a willingness to negotiate professionally in such a way that the sleeping beasts of prey among the party activists are not provoked.

Out on the Ice--Now!

Even so it is a very open question how long SF can continue to cooperate with the Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals. Many of the voters are quite uncommitted, the competition is right on the SF heels--and the possibility that the traditional conflict in the party will spring up again does exist.

But there is nothing else for SF to do than to discuss the problems thoroughly as frankly and open-mindedly as possible within the party and in general to see how long the ice will hold up in the cooperation with the government. For the truth is that if one cannot cooperate now under the existing

parliamentary conditions, it will not be possible to cooperate under an S-SF majority either. The problems and the basic premises will not change even if some marginal voter shifts in an election do produce a labor majority.

(The article has been condensed from the issue of the SF theoretical organ, PRAKSIS, that is coming out just before the SF congress over the holiday on the second weekend in May.)

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CSO: 3106/119

SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S PARTY HAS CONFLICT OF IDEOLOGY, POWER

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 10 May 82 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] The high point of the SF [Socialist People's Party] national congress was absolutely the Saturday night revue for the delegates. There the party's gray eminence, editor-in-chief Torben Krogh, acted as "master of ceremonies." In an outstanding parody of one thing and another, Krogh introduced the main theme of the congress--the "March package."

The March package was brought on stage in the physical form of a beautifully wrapped cardboard box, while Krogh, dressed as a cast-off rocker from the 1960's (or a punk from the 1980's), made fun of the contents and the circumstances under which they had been discussed.

The applause was tremendous too when Krogh made fun of the speculations about the party's newest "crown prince," Pelle Voigt, by referring to him as a "poodle" trying to turn himself into a new "young lion." After the congress was over, several people thought that Krogh's ridicule was the reason why young Voigt lost his membership on the executive committee voting although--under a sex quota system--he ended up as first alternate.

Krogh's antics--with a ducktail haircut, a pink tie hanging loose over an SF T-shirt, blue glasses and one green sock and one red one--received overwhelming applause and also illustrated in a backhanded way the paradoxical situation the party is in. Unofficially, several prominent SF people call Krogh the party's only "political head." SF chairman Petersen is obviously more concerned with peace work and international politics than with the tedious irritations of Christiansborg. Folketing group chairman Ebba Strange is acknowledged on all sides for her sincerity and good will, but she is not credited with having great strategic skill. Pelle Voigt has in this particular situation been able to stick his nose out too far and has been given a rap for doing so.

But who then will try to transform SF's political goal into operational political effectiveness? Krogh is one of the few to make the attempt. He was

tenth on the list of 19 elected by the congress to the executive committee. Thus his support in the party can be said to be "average."

Thus Krogh epitomizes the SF dilemma, which is also shown by the fact that--after the outstanding election victory--the party is next to last in the Folketing organizational percentages. It has 1.6, the Social Democrats have 15, the Danish CP 25 and the Liberals lead them all with 28.

SF represents first and foremost a good hope. The voter support shows that many people feel there are possibilities in democratic socialism and in a concrete reform effort "here and now," but there is less support for the tedious work needed to handle that hope. And those who do so are tempted, like Krogh, to compensate for lack of support by using the dubious method of ridicule.

The SF congress ended with a political statement which in chairman Petersen's words "keeps the doors open." The talks in the next few weeks will be decisive. The delegates at the congress, with great respect for the party's own institutions and democratic life, have placed the important decisions in the hands of the new executive committee. It is not strange, but a little depressing even so, that those who are most clearly taking on this job have chosen the mask of irony when the realities had to be laid out before the congress.

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LIBERAL CHAIRMAN ATTACKS LACK OF SDP UNITY ON NATO, EC

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 15 May 82 p 5

[Text] There is mounting uncertainty in sections of the Social Democratic Party concerning vital aspects of the basis for Danish foreign policy--our membership in NATO and EC.

Liberal chairman Henning Christophersen wrote that in the latest issue of the party's monthly periodical, LIBERAL. He sharply attacked the government's foreign policy which he finds unclear, ambiguous and confusing on major political issues.

The former foreign minister in the S-V [Social Democratic-Liberal] government pointed out that Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen has welcomed the proposals for international detente made by both American President Reagan and Soviet President Brezhnev. Christophersen also stressed the government's critical attitude toward developments in El Salvador compared to a milder criticism of conditions in Poland. Finally, he referred to the government's talk of a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

"This attitude seems to be a result of the Social Democrats' lack of interest in the western community as a whole," wrote Henning Christophersen who also maintained that at times the government's attitude has an "unpleasant tinge of anti-Americanism and skepticism with regard to our West European partners."

On Wednesday evening, the Social Democratic Folketing group held a meeting on the party's position when Denmark takes over the EC chairmanship on 1 July. There was another debate between supporters and opponents of EC which revealed a new split in the group concerning the question of EC membership.

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BRIEFS

NEW SDP YOUTH CHAIRMAN--Danish Social Democratic Youth elected 24-year-old Jan Petersen of Copenhagen as its new chairman to succeed Finn Larsen who did not wish to run for re-election. Jan Petersen is vice chairman of HK [Union of Retail Business and Clerical Workers] Youth and he places emphasis on closer contacts between DSU [Danish Social Democratic Youth] and the unions. For the first time in the history of DSU, women were elected as vice chairman and secretary. The new vice chairman is 21-year-old office assistant Kirsten Jensen. She works in LO [Danish Federation of Trade Unions]. Charlotte Schultz, a 24-year-old metalworker, became secretary of the society. A statement from the DSU congress said there must be "greater harmony between the ideological basis of Social Democracy and concrete policy." [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 10 May 82 p 3] 6578

SCHLUTER: JORGENSEN AS COALITION PRESIDENT--Conservative chairman Poul Schluter is willing to abandon the idea of a "four-leaf-clover government" in favor of a broad coalition government headed by Anker Jorgensen as prime minister. Poul Schluter voiced this idea at the meeting of the Conservative Youth national council in Holstebro. "It would be natural for the Social Democrats, as the biggest party, to demand the prime minister's post," said Poul Schluter. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 11 May 82 p 1] 6578

CSO: 3106/110

BRIEFS

JORGENSEN HANDLING EC NEGOTIATIONS--By the end of the current year at the latest, the negotiations between Denmark and EC on the terms for Greenland's withdrawal from the community must be concluded and the changes in the EC treaties signed if Greenland's withdrawal is to take effect on 1 January 1984, the date Greenland is aiming at. Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen revealed this in a report to Folketing on the outcome of the EC referendum in Greenland in February and the upcoming negotiations in EC. At the same time he stressed that Greenland's membership has meant significant economic benefits for Greenland and that EC has shown great understanding with regard to the special conditions in Greenland. However, Greenland believes that further development of home rule will go better outside of EC. Under Kjeld Olesen's timetable, it will be Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen, as chairman of the Council in the half year from July to January, who will call and lead the government conference that will make the final decision on the content of the treaty amendments and send them out for ratification by individual member nations. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 29 Apr 82 p 4] 6578

CSO: 3106/110

PCF IDENTITY AFTER YEAR IN GOVERNMENT ANALYZED

Paris LE MONDE in French 7 May 82 p 8

[Article by Patrick Jarreau: "The PCF in the Government: Identifying Without Losing Identity"]

[Text] Last 20 April, Mr Georges Marchais asked the communists not to "stand aside" from the experiment of the left that has been conducted since 10 May 1981. The PCF-PS alliance is not always a fact accepted by everyone, as is shown by the need to reaffirm it nearly a year after the Central Committee endorsed Mr Mitterrand on the second round of the presidential election and 10 months after the two parties made an agreement that is the reason why four communists are in the government. The PCF general secretary could have chosen to ignore the fact. Rather he decided to emphasize it in order to state that the union is not due to the force of circumstances as far as the communists are concerned.

The PCF's guiding policy is now to preserve freedom of action, if only in appearance, within a coalition that it cannot desert without harm to itself. This policy is basically not very different from that of various PS groups that were forced to unite at the Valence congress in October 1981; this union is not without its irritations, which are partly expressed in disagreements caused by problems of government action. From the government's viewpoint, the present problem of relations with the PCF does not exceed this limit for the most part. However, from the PCF's viewpoint, it does cover a complex situation.

Since the PCF came into the majority and into the government, it has been partly integrated into the institutional arrangement dating from 10 May. When Mr Marchais or some other communist leader uses "we" in talking about the work of the government, they are exaggerating a little the actual relationship between the two parties, but they are not wrong. This "we" has an educational purpose and is intended for party members who may be slow in realizing how their party's situation has changed; it does reflect actual experience, and not just that of the four ministers and their staffs. The deputies and local elected officials see that the left in the government is unified in the opinion of most of their constituents.

However, the communists are also in the position of being followers. They are taking responsibility for someone else's policy or, at least, for a policy that is not the one they had been publicly promoting since the breakdown of the joint program in September 1977. How can they reconcile themselves to this?

The PCF has taken several tacks since 23 June 1981. In the interval between the presidential and legislative elections it emphasized that it was also a winner in the victory of 10 May and attempted to finesse government initiatives and stress its own contribution. During the summer, L'HUMANITE's silence was broken by only a few bitter remarks made in response to the arguments on the left for a "social-democratic" policy, while the newspaper stressed the campaign for peace and disarmament.

Autumn brought a change. Mr Roland Leroy spoke for the politburo at the anniversary celebration of L'HUMANITE on 13 September, explaining that the PCF is a party "in" and not "of" the government. Stress was placed on the accomplishments of the communist ministers, whose popularity was confirmed by both polls and their reception at the celebration of L'HUMANITE. No judgment was made of the government's first 100 days, but the implication was that it was lacking.

Doing Better

The prelude to the 24th congress gave L'HUMANITE's editorial columns the opportunity to make thinly veiled criticisms of the PS, and they repeatedly stressed the limited opportunities made possible by the victory of the left. As though to lend substance to these reservations, the communist ministers took exception on 10 November to the social security financing adopted by the Council of Ministers; it included restoring a 1-percent salary withholding increase.

The leadership had to combat those within the party who took the spring election losses as confirming the policy that the leadership had imposed since 1978. The leadership set about to defend this policy, although it contradicted communist participation in a majority and a government largely dominated by a party that they felt had "swung to the right." In a speech by Mr Charles Fiterman at the congress at the beginning of February, this participation was therefore relegated to the status of an exception destined to last only a short while. The events in Poland strengthened this attitude, because the PCF found itself isolated on this issue. For internal and external reasons, the time had not yet come to begin questioning the party's presence in the government. This fact was restated in Mr Marchais' closing speech, which showed how the PCF stood on the matter: the government was "on the right track," and the PCF should help it do better.

This speech held until the cantonal elections of March 1982. The communist leaders had no illusions about what the PCF's score would be, but they did hope for results equal to or slightly better than those of the June 1981 legislative elections--if only because of the slight advantage the PCF had been having in departmental consultations, and they hoped these results would validate the policy they had been following since 10 May. The returns confirmed a drop in the communist vote, but it was lumped together with the majority parties' vote. The communists concluded that their fate is linked with that of the government as far as the electorate is concerned. The voters who left the PCF in 1981 and who were disappointed by the leftist parties did not choose to show their impatience by returning to the fold; they stayed home.

The communist leaders concluded that they needed more than ever to stick with the decision of 10 May. This option had already been stated in the declaration adopted with the PS between the two rounds of the cantonal elections and was developed further at the Central Committee meeting of 23 March. Mr Marchais reviewed the tactics used before the election and refused to raise the stakes: "We cannot show ourselves to be a revolutionary party by 'me-too-ism,'" he said. "We shall be neither yes-men nor wet blankets," the general secretary stated a month later as he appealed to party leaders and members to put into practice the resolutions previously adopted concerning the necessity of learning how to be a government party.

"We Agree!"

Mr Fiterman had emphasized this in his speech to the 24th congress. He quoted the political satirist and singer Raymond Devos, who once suggested that the communists splash a big "We Agree!" headline across page one of L'HUMANITE; the minister of Transportation urged the party to change its image of eternal oppositionists and affirm the "vocation" of communists "to build, manage and govern." The cantonal elections showed that once the PCF was in the government, it could no longer hope to attract as it used to the votes of those who want most of all to express their dissatisfaction.

The leaders officially admit that their party's identity is more generally in question. How can they support the socialists' policy without ceasing to be communists? First, by emphasizing that the policy is also the PCF's to the extent that it corresponds to a step on the democratic way to socialism that the party advocates. By taking part in the government, the communists hope to overcome once and for all a past that they feel has been perpetuated by the "delay" that they say their party suffered at the end of the Stalinist period and did not begin to make up until 1976. In no case, however, can the leadership admit that the memory of this past was revived by the policy followed between 1977 and 1981. At most, it conceded last 25 March through Mr Marchais that some communist voters might have been "disoriented."

For the communist leaders, being a government party also means knowing how to use the possibility open to them to accentuate their disagreements with current policy. They have done so, for example, by not voting for radio-TV reform, thus making it possible for the PCF to appear to be closer to the concerns of journalists and writers and more faithful to the left's tradition of defending public service.

The communists have also expressed their disagreement with measures announced by the prime minister favoring business. The communists thus continue to define themselves as the party of the working class and class struggle next to a PS that they still suspect lacks the will to face up to the hostility of economic power. As the communists cannot identify completely with a policy that they did not originate, they have to send signals from their positions in the new government to distinguish themselves from their partner.. Mr Jack Ralite is pursuing this objective in his own way by defending the demand for equal medical care for all against the doctors who are behind the action of conservative leaders. There is symbolism in the confrontation between the minister of Health and the Medical Solidarity association.

Within the PCF this practice is criticized by those who rejected the line followed up to 1981. For example, Mr Francois Hincker, a former member of the Central Committee, explains in the 29 April issue of RENCONTRES COMMUNISTES-HEBDO that the PCF denounced the "gift to the bosses" without starting a debate on what leftist industrial policy ought to be and that this resulted in "turning the workers' discontent against the government and moving the relationship of class forces in the wrong direction." In other words, the PCF leadership seems to be using the cover of talking unity while seeking to maintain or provoke grassroots defiance of a government within which the communists cannot make their positions dominant.

The Approaching Municipal Elections

The communist leaders were caught off base by Mr Mitterrand's victory and suddenly had to go in the other direction.. Various indications combine to show that they did not expect Mr Giscard d'Estaing to lose. Otherwise, would they have taken chances by spreading--and, for some of them, encouraging--propaganda within the party for what one leader, who is now a ministerial staffer, called a "revolutionary vote for Giscard"? Once the party leadership decided to jump on the 10 May bandwagon, they obliged party members and leaders to "sell" the workers on a policy that they had been telling them for 3 years to reject; and some of these party members had been recruited and some of the leaders promoted during the period in which the PCF was resisting the "illusion of change" generated by the PS. Was it sufficient for the communists to join the government to justify this switch? Did their very presence in the government not belie previous statements to the effect that Mr Mitterrand did not want communist ministers any more than he wanted real nationalizations?

Having attempted to justify simultaneously their previous policy and their participation in the government, the PCF leaders are now striving to teach the rank and file what the responsibilities of political power require. There are several reasons for this. The four communist ministers, who meet every Tuesday at the ministry for Vocational Training, note that they do not have much of an alternative to offer to the basic policy directions inspired by Mr Mitterrand and carried out by Mr Mauroy. Also, elected officials point out that the work they have been doing, especially in the cities where they have won elections since 1977, would be mostly lost if their party adopted a line that meant calling into question the union of the left and the victory that that union made possible. Mr Mitterrand's options offer no solid basis for the breakaway policy that some people in the PCF might want. And, finally, municipal elections will be held less than a year from now. Historically, the party's strength at the local level has been crucial for its influence nationwide, not to mention that it is logistically important to supporting the communist party apparatus.

The situation stemming from the cantonal elections has led the socialists to ease up on their pressure on the PCF, especially concerning the events in Poland, and this gives the communists a chance to try to overcome the difficulties due to their stance in the period 1977-81. But Poland will still be a drag on the PCF's prospects as long as the party rejects any PCI-style solution to the problem; the PCF considers international relations as still being shaped by opposition between the socialist and Western camps and want to preserve this facet of its identity.

For French communist leaders, the left's taking power in France and the appearance of a mass democratic movement in Poland are not signs that the lines of force have changed in the international situation. On this point, their analysis is basically no different from that of the president of the Republic, except that Mr Mitterrand has shaped his foreign policy on the prospect of a long-term emergence from the framework of the Yalta agreement.

Mr Marchais' status as party leader seems to have been strengthened by last year's tests; he has committed himself to having the party reconquer its identity through active participation in governmental change. As the general secretary likes to say, it is a new "challenge" to the forces that seem to be drawing the PCF into a steady decline.

8782

CSO: 3100/629

RETIRED MILITARY URGE WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO

Athens ELEFTHEROTYPIA in Greek 5 Apr 82 p 7

[Text] The solutions to our national problems and the contribution of our country to international peace can be promoted successfully outside the military ties of NATO. The security of the peoples and international peace will benefit from the gradual erosion and final dissolution of existing military alliances.

That is what 16 Greek retired military officers who served in the higher and highest levels of the armed forces and NATO declared on the occasion of yesterday's 33rd anniversary of the founding of the organization and the completion of 30 years of Greek participation.

Other points that were emphasized in their declaration were:

The position of NATO in our national affairs has been negative in the past and continues to be the least friendly. Irrefutable witnesses: The Cypriot tragedy, the 7-year tyranny, the crisis in the Aegean and the continuous voting against us.

While the founders of NATO proclaimed its defensive character, in the course of its development, its operational capabilities became inconceivably aggressive.

The declaration ends as follows: "For all of these reasons, but also because we believe in a nationally independent Greece, outside of military formations, without nuclear weapons and foreign bases, we consider the solution to the national problems of the country and its contribution to international peace can be promoted successfully outside the military ties of NATO, by getting out of the Rogers treaty, by departing from the military side of the alliance, within the framework of an undivided, peaceful and democratic Europe free of nuclear weapons.

"We believe that the security of the peoples and international peace will benefit, not from the increase in armaments and the reinforcement of existing military alliances, but from their gradual erosion and final dissolution."

The declaration is signed by: Ret Gen Georgios Koumanakos, Ret Air Force Lt Gen Giorgos Pleionis, Ret Major Gen Andonis Papaspyrou, Ret Rear Admiral Militiadis Papathanasiou, Ret Major Gen Spyros Tsamasiotis, Ret Air Force Major Gen Nikolaos

Tzovlas, Ret Air Force Major Gen Khar. Perogiannakis, Ret Air Force Major Gen Khristos Alexandropoulos, Ret Air Force Brig Gen Mikhalis Tombopoulos, Ret Air Force Brig Gen Doros Kleiamakis, Ret Air Force Brig Gen Dim. Kounanis, Ret Brig Gen Andonis Kyriakopoulos, Ret Brig Gen Apost. Kolios, Ret Col Elevth. Papagounos, Ret Air Force Lt Col Nikos Apostolidis, Ret Air Force Lt Col Faidon Kourkouvelis.

9346

CSO: 4621/299

GOVERNMENT RAPPED FOR INCONSISTENT POLICIES

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 5 Apr 82 p 4

[Text] As an economist and politician, the prime minister knows, of course, that a government (and especially a modern government) cannot progress and achieve its objectives without strict programming--short-term, medium-term and long-term.

We do not doubt that the ministers who surround the prime minister also know this basic rule, as well as what it means to forget the basic rules in governing the nation. And yet.....

And yet, certain incidents that made their appearance lately show that the government's programming, at least for the short term, presents deficiencies. Decisions are announced that are not carried out. Measures are announced that are modified a little later. Changes of direction, either unjustified or even unforgivable. We will recall a few:

An increase in taxation was announced in certain cases, and a little later a decrease in the increase of this taxation.

An increase in the price of beer was announced and a little later a decrease in the increase of the price of beer.

At first an increase in the price of cigarettes was announced, a little later the price of cigarettes was stabilized and again a little later another increase in the price of cigarettes was announced.

The demolition of all the buildings that were illegally erected in the Attiki basin was announced and a little later the "densely constructed illegal buildings" were integrated into the city plan.

It was announced that the bill for public administration provided for the removal of all the legal counselors and a little later their exemption from removal was made known.

It was announced in the same bill that 5,000 doctors in the civil service would be removed and a little later the decision was changed.

We do not think that it is necessary to cite other examples since the picture that comes up is already clear: in various sectors, short-term programming is suffering and certain ministers seem to be possessed by compulsive talking, exactly where silence would be golden.

Of course, it would not be possible for anyone to imagine, even if only academically, that the general activities of the government, so gigantic and salutary for the country, could be endangered by the above incidents. And just the cleansing of the rotten public administration system, the recognition of the National Resistance and the "anti-330" law would be enough to ensure the government a triumphant recognition by the Greek people.

This, however, does not mean that changes in direction or the lack of thoroughness are forgiven (or even permitted), at a time when the right, enraged by the blows it received, is eagerly waiting with gun and poison for the slightest wrong move of "Allagi" [change].

9346

CSO: 4621/299

GOVERNMENT URGED TO DISBAND GREEK-AMERICAN CLUB

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 2 Apr 82 p 4

[Text] The organization of American espionage, the infamous, notorious and shadowy CIA, has its sub-branches in as many countries as it can, in any way it can and behind every mask it will consider advantageous. If, however, by some "unfortunate coincidence" this mask happens to fall, then the sub-branch that is revealed is a burnt paper and the CIA--the poor thing--must unfortunately, go to the trouble of finding another mask.

In Greece, the latest burnt paper of the CIA is its sub-branch that was hiding until yesterday behind the mask of the "Greek-American Union." It operated smoothly for several decades, with the legal form of a Greek entity, serving the political objectives of Washington under the guise of fostering "cultural and educational goals", as stated in its constitution. But the "unfortunate coincidence" came unexpectedly in the form of a strike of its teaching staff, which occupied the offices, opened the drawers and brought out in the open the secret documents that prove the truth.

What will happen now? The teachers' demands will be satisfied, the occupation will end; and the CIA sub-branch will continue its activity as if nothing happened? We should hope not! The Greek authorities must seriously consider the fact that, after the revelation, the CIA will more probably dissolve the "Greek-American Union", its burnt paper, to prepare some new mask. The more correct action by the Greek authorities, therefore, would be to beat the CIA to the draw and dissolve a club that "has deviated from its objective, etc. etc."

As for some "honorable" administrative employees who, the same day of the discovery made by their teacher colleagues hastened to announce to the entire country that "the take-overs constitute a social problem since they impede studies," they should rather be ashamed for so flagrantly forgetting the nationality mentioned in their police identity cards!

9346

CSO: 4621/299

BONDEVIK: CHRISTIAN PARTY MUST FIND OWN COALITION TERMS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 8 May 82 p 3

[Interview with Kjell Magne Bondevik by Thorleif Andreassen]

[Text] "I am no problematical 'pivot man'; I want to contribute to the party's finding its way to a unifying solution of the government question." So says Kjell Magne Bondevik, parliamentary leader of the Christian People's Party [KrF]. He emphasizes that the cause of nonsocialist cooperation is served by his party's finding its strategy itself and without pressure. AFTENPOSTEN has reason to believe that the following wish is steadily becoming more widespread in the KrF: We are a political party and not a sect. Let us therefore get into the government and gain influence!

Kjell Magne Bondevik points out the obvious advantages of a majority government: It more easily gets a majority for its proposals and the individual government parties have an influence on issues at an earlier point in time. He adds, however, that the present situation also has its advantages.

The parliamentary leader of the KrF emphasizes that it is important to discuss the government question calmly within the party, and not out in public.

[Question] Is the present parliamentary situation satisfying for the Christian People's Party?

[Answer] It gives us good possibilities of bringing influence to bear through the forms of cooperation we have with the government. For the time being we must work to do the best possible in this situation.

[Question] How long is "for the time being"?

[Answer] It is not possible to give any indication of time. The most important thing in this connection is that before the Storting election in 1985 all parties declared their position on the government question. That was so that after the 1985 election we could maintain and strengthen the nonsocialist majority. During this period the nonsocialist majority must show that this majority is not an intermezzo. Such a plan of cooperation can create the necessary fervor and optimism.

[Question] Will your party have clarified the government question before the party congress in April of next year?

[Answer] Yes, in the time from now to the party congress we are counting on getting a clarification of that question.

[Question] Is the Christian People's Party on the way to becoming a sect?

[Answer] The Christian People's Party is a political party. That means that we must enter into a society and work even if that society is characterized in many fields by other values than those the party stands for. We must be prepared to work in the world of compromise. Obviously our party does not want to isolate itself.

[Question] And that means that the party wants position?

[Answer] Yes. Purely in general terms it is necessary to get as many as possible of our proposals put through. But situations can arise where you come to a crossroads and renounce positions to show the seriousness of an issue.

[Question] You have been regarded as a brake block in the government question. Are you no longer so?

[Answer] I have stood for what have been the main currents in the Christian People's Party's view. Last year I felt that the party had gotten into a situation where we had to draw the line.

8815

CSO: 3108/104

PAPER EXAMINES CONSERVATIVES' DROP IN LATEST POLL

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 3 May 82 p 4

[Editorial]

[Text] The latest political opinion poll by Norwegian Market Data, which was published last week, is one of the most interesting we have had in a long time. Not because the shifts in support for the individual parties from month to month are more dramatic than we have been accustomed to, but because for the first time in a very long time we have got a majority for the two socialist parties, the Labor Party and the Socialist Left Party. The two parties have a combined support of 44.9 percent. The three cooperating parties--the Conservative Party, the Center Party, and the Christian People's Party--together have 43.2 percent of the voters behind them. For purposes of comparison, the non-socialist bloc had 47.7 percent in the Storting election a little over 6 months ago, while the SV [Socialist Left] and A [Labor Party] together had 42.1 percent.

A corresponding shift is seen when the figures for the two principal rivals--the Labor Party and the Conservative Party--are evaluated in isolation. At the time of the Storting election the difference between the two parties was 5.3 percent in the Labor Party's favor. The difference has now increased to 10.5 percent.

No statistical margin of error that the opinion poll institutes take account of can explain away this change of climate that has taken place in regard to the voters' views on who they think has the best ability to manage the country. We agree with DAGBLADET when that paper writes: "The government's strategists, in any case, cannot use them as evidence that what the voters want right now is more Conservative Party policy."

Both the governing party and the two parties that support it in the Storting are now hit by stagnation and decline. For the Conservative Party the declining support is obviously worrisome. However, it can be explained by the strategists on the basis that a party in governing position will always be exposed, and that the governing party must reckon with the fact that in hard times disillusioned voters turn their backs on those in power.

It is the parties of the center that must now really ask themselves whether they have followed the right path. Neither of them has had anything to gain by

acting as a supporting party for the government and at the same time trying to mark out its own policy. The Christian People's Party has had a real decline in support in every opinion poll since the election, even though the decline falls within the margin of possible error. The Center Party has not had especially great change from the election result, but then that party did exceptionally poorly in the election. With the low score the Center Party had in September of last year, the party can by no means declare itself pleased that the situation is unchanged.

As the situation now is, the parties of the center must soon make a decision. Either they must cut loose entirely from the Conservative Party and act freely and independently in the Storting, or they must choose to go into the government with the Conservative Party. The balancing act they are trying now has shown itself useless. We assume that the coming congresses of the two parties will take a stand on this point.

It does not seem very daring to us to assume that the parties of the center will choose "the broad path"--joining the government. At any rate, in the free-floating position between all and nothing the parties have very little to gain.

We agree with former prime minister Odvar Nordli when he says in an interview with AFTENPOSTEN: "The parties of the center should soon realize the hopelessness of betting on two horses at the same time... The Christian People's Party, the Center Party, and the Conservative Party can contribute to useful political clarification by entering into a binding government coalition, and at this time there is no other realistic government alternative."

From ARBEIDERBLADET's position in politics, we have no desire to make it as easy as possible for non-socialist parties to get their policy carried out. Nevertheless, we have a strong desire for clear parliamentary lines, so that the voters have something concrete to rely on.

In the short time it has been functioning, the Willoch government has created a political obscurity the like of which we have hardly seen since the war (if we disregard the last 2 years of the Borten government). Nothing is to be gained by simply allowing the situation to develop. The question, therefore, is whether, judging by the distribution of power in the present Storting, we would not all be best served by the non-socialist parties' joining forces.

8815

CSO: 3108/105

PAPER ATTACKS GOVERNMENT FOR FAILING TO OPPOSE TURKEY

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 7 May 82 p 4

[Editorial: "Need for Initiative"]

[Text] Yesterday's foreign policy debate in the Storting showed a Labor Party with a desire for new orientation and a desire for active initiatives. That contrasted strongly with the withdrawn, constantly appraising, but passive attitude that the spokesmen of the Conservative Party and the government took in the debate. The two parties that support the government, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party, also show a strong inclination in foreign policy and security policy to cooperate with the Conservative Party. There is still a desire to mark out positions of their own, but when it comes down to brass tacks they settle back into the Conservative rut. In the KrF's [Christian People's Party's] case that was most clearly demonstrated yesterday in connection with the need for a new defense strategy for NATO. It is obvious that Kåre Kristiansen, chairman of the foreign affairs committee, pretty well sees the need to reduce nuclear arms and change NATO's first strike strategy, but gets somewhat half-hearted when the position must be adjusted to the Conservative Party's and Foreign Minister Stray's negative attitudes toward the same question.

For the Center Party it was the Turkey question that revealed the distance between verbal attitudes and political capability and will. Johan J. Jakobsen, the chairman and parliamentary leader of the party, expressed himself on Turkey in a way that could have only one conclusion: Turkey must be immediately summoned before the human rights commission in Strasbourg. But when Jakobsen got closer to the heart of the matter, it turned out that the action he wants the government to take is merely to find out whether other countries want to take action with us against Turkey. But as we understand it, that is what the Norwegian government has been doing for a long time.

The NATO strategy and the Turkey case were the very issues that were central in the foreign policy debate. The Labor Party presented proposals that urged the government to take up in the NATO council the question of appointing a committee to evaluate the alliance's atomic strategy. In another proposal, which was presented by the Labor Party together with the Socialist Left Party and the Liberal Party, the government was asked to summon the Turkish government before the human rights commission.

The Labor Party had turned the spotlight on the military dictatorship in Turkey back last fall. To begin with it was reasonable for the Willoch government to take some time to consult with other countries and investigate the possibilities of joint action against the Turkish government. Now the time for consultations has long since been used up. When the European Council gave its support in January to the idea of taking the case up before the human rights commission in Strasbourg, the government should have acted.

We see all the good arguments that tell in favor of several countries' standing together in this matter. But if that does not happen, we see no reason that Norway should shrink from taking an initiative itself. This is a situation quite parallel to the one that we had when the case against the junta of colonels in Greece was raised. On that occasion Norway stood alone to begin with, but was gradually followed by the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden. When it comes to the situation in Turkey, we must now reject all political and tactical appraisals and go to the core of the matter. There is no development toward democracy in Turkey. The military dictatorship imprisons and tortures politicians and professional men. Such conditions cannot be defended--either politically or morally--by a country which is a member, with us, of an alliance that is supposed to defend the western democracies. The Norwegian government must now stop negotiating and begin to act.

The attitudes toward new NATO strategy that came out in yesterday's debate show that the Labor Party is willing to participate fully in the new security policy orientation that is seeking today to find the responsible answer to the dangers that threaten our very existence, namely atomic weapons. And here the Labor Party is in good company. The chairman of NATO's military committee, Admiral Falls, from Canada, has advocated studying the purposefulness of the atomic strategy. Four well-known Americans, including Robert McNamara and George F. Kennan, have done the same in a magazine article recently.

This is obviously not a simple question, but it is all the more important for it to get under way. The objective is to eliminate atomic weapons from European soil. We can hardly imagine an objective that should evoke a greater degree of enthusiasm.

All the more regrettable for that reason is the lukewarm attitude that today's political authorities in our country take on precisely that issue.

8815

CSO: 3108/105

LABOR PARTY ORGAN HITS GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC PLAN

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 8 May 82 p 4

[Editorial]

[Text] So now the Willoch government has presented its long-range program. For all who feel themselves linked to the labor movement, and who have wanted to safeguard and strengthen the welfare state, the government's latest production is downright frightening reading. For the first time in the post-war period we are presented with a government program that fundamentally breaks with the basic ideas of the welfare society.

We shall content ourselves here with presenting a few examples of the means that the Conservative Party government wants to use to attain its political objectives:

- The user's share of payment for social services is to be increased. This means among other things that the individual patient will pay still more for health services. This first of all hits the chronically ill and the elderly.
- Public consumption is to be further cut back. This means less public service. In addition, the direct public effort to ensure full employment will be reduced.
- The subsidies are to be lowered. This means, among other things, higher food prices and greater problems for big families with many children.

The Willoch government finds it proper to do all this in order to give individual income tax relief and "to restore the economy's ability to grow," as the pretty phrase runs. In reality it means a policy that will ensure tax relief for those who already have most, and that at the expense of people who have problems enough already.

The long-range program is not only marked by frightening political objectives. It also openly admits that it will be difficult to fulfill the many promises made during the Conservative Party's election campaign. If the government is to explain to disappointed Conservative voters why things have gone that way, the explanation is not marked by much self-reproach. It is not the Conservative Party that was mistaken and promised too much before the election. No, indeed. It is the Labor Party governments that are to blame. They turned the bankrupt concern over to Kåre Willoch and his ministers. Everything turned out

to be much worse than even the present prime minister had imagined beforehand--and, as is well known, he never thought very highly of his predecessors. The whole thing is a propaganda number the like of which we have hardly ever seen here in Norway before.

In our opinion it is downright dishonest to use the arguments the government is putting out to explain the Conservative Party's broken promises. In addition to the Labor Party, it is the international slump that is to blame for the Conservative Party's having so much greater problems than it foresaw. Just listen: Estimates of revenues from the oil operations are drastically reduced, the international business upswing is coming later than expected, cost increases in Norway have been greater than predicted, and our competitiveness has developed more weakly than was counted on.

The only thing that has not been wrong, as far as we can understand it, is the Conservative Party's own appraisal and the Willoch government's political plan. It does not even occur to the government that there were also such things as business conditions before the change of government in October 1981.

Another peculiarity of the long-range program is that it does not say anything about where the savings and changes of priorities are to take place. Nor is any alternative offered to the long-range budget that the Harlem Brundtland government presented. We view that as something in the nature of trickery. We are merely referred to the autumn state budget. Not until then are we to find out more precisely what the results are to be.

The Conservative Party assured its cooperating partners in the Storting earlier that the party would discuss all major issues with them in advance. We must therefore assume that the Center Party and the Christian People's Party have been oriented on the long-range program beforehand. If the two parties of the center are thinking of supporting the objectives of the Conservative Government's program, that represents a definite break with their own party platforms. If, on the other hand, they do not support the government in this field, that must mean a considerable weakening of non-socialist cooperation.

It will be exciting to follow the further fate of the government program that has now been presented.

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CSO: 3108/105

OBSERVER SEES 'COLLISION' AMONG NONSOCIALISTS IN FALL

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 8 May 82 p 6

[Commentary by Nils Ottar Ask]

[Text] A year ago the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party, and the Center Party said that my, your, and the country's problems would be solved if only the voters provided a nonsocialist majority. The disagreements among them would be cleared out of the way when they got a chance to sit down in private and talk things out.

The voters fulfilled the nonsocialists' wish, but the three parties got into fights with each other, as is well known, when it came to putting together the miracle government. The finely worded statements about common positions turned out not to hold up in practical politics. And since then the disagreement has at times broken out in open confrontations and warnings when everyday politics interfered with the individual parties' obsessions. But at the same time none of them have ventured to admit that the common positions are not a good enough document for a common nonsocialist policy. And in order to show that in spite of everything there is more to bring them together than to separate them, they have been quick to come out and pat each other on the cheek after boxing each other's ears. The dream of the promised government must be kept alive.

Toward Collision

But if the three parties' words are to be trusted, we cannot understand how they can live so very much longer by that dream. The annotations to the government's revised national budget and the parliamentary report on the long-range program show clearly that the three parties are on the way to a mighty collision. On highly important questions the KrF [Christian People's Party] and SP [Center Party] have priorities different from those of the Conservative Party and the government. If this is due to a change of course by one of the parties, there will surely be divided opinions on it in the nonsocialist camp.

But the Conservative Party must assume the responsibility for the worsening atmosphere that is about to develop among the three parties. Yesterday's government documents show clearly that a more decidedly Conservative policy is now planned than the KrF and SP believed after the statement of common positions. Willoch has also been aware for some time and taken account of the impatience that is making itself felt in the party's own ranks and that was expressed at the Conservative Party congress recently.

Progressive Party Support

We shall not use the Progressive Party [FrP] as a witness of truth, but in this connection it is worth noting that Carl I. Hagen now feels that the government has set out on the right course. The FrP has not been scattering words of praise of the government's policy around in the past.

The Conservative Party also concedes that it will not be so easy to get the parties of the center to go along with it on what it is now setting out to do, and what will be concretized in the state budget in the fall. The comment of the Conservative Party's financial spokesman, Jan P. Syse, is that he takes an optimistic view of the possibilities of solving the economic problems provided there is sufficiently broad support for what the government is setting out to do.

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CSO: 3108/105

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

NORDIC PEACE MARCHERS TO USSR--Up to 250 participants in the Scandinavian peace march will be permitted to travel in a special "peace train" to several Soviet cities in July, according to information released on Tuesday by authorities in Moscow. A group of women under the leadership of university professor Eva Nordland of Oslo will march for peace and against nuclear weapons and arms buildups in the Soviet Union in connection with the peace movement. Representatives of the organization "Women for Peace" were sent to Moscow last April to arrange permission for the peace demonstration. This is believed to be the first time that Soviet authorities have granted permission for such a demonstration. Authorities in Moscow said that 50 persons each from Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland had received permission to travel with the train in the Soviet Union. The demonstrators also have permission to hold public meetings in the cities they will visit. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 5 May 82 p 11] 9336

CSO: 3109/154

PRIME MINISTER AFFIRMS ARMS EXPORT POLICY

Paris LES ECHOS in French 4 May 82 p 3

[Article by Jacques Jublin: "Pierre Mauroy Says 'Yes' to Arms Exports"]

[Text] "Yes, I am in favor of France exporting arms provided these are not sent to areas of conflict."

There was certainly no ambiguity in the statement made yesterday by Pierre Mauroy at Mourmelon, in Champagne, where he attended a French Army tactical conventional and nuclear demonstration.

"We are selling arms abroad because different foreign countries have the same view of defense that we do, namely the desire to keep themselves in a balanced position between the major blocs. We also export for economic, industrial, and international reasons. Each citizen must realize this."

Thus this national policy was affirmed at the highest official level, and at a time when some critics are pointing the finger of scorn at France for its arms sales in Latin America and the Middle East.

From an economic standpoint, the prime minister cannot overlook France's 1981 arms sales totaling 34 billion francs, with their multiple industrial and social repercussions. Not to mention technology. "We have to pay part of the costs of developing the sophisticated weapons needed for our defense by exporting."

There are no limitations imposed on these exports. This policy will reassure different customers provided they are not in any of the world's extremely hot spots. At a time when development costs are steadily soaring, exports are the moving force behind domestic activity and have a moderating impact on the budget.

Pierre Mauroy made this very clear when confirming the government's desire to arm the country with a "supermissile" replacing the army's present tactical nuclear missile, the Pluton. This new missile, the Hades, will be operational in the 1990's and have a range of some 250 kilometers compared with the Pluton's present 120-kilometer range.

There will be no reduction in defense outlays. In the 1983 budget, 3.94 percent of the gross domestic product will be allocated to the military. Pierre Mauroy "will keep his promises." He solemnly declared: "France's armed forces are commensurate with the country's aspirations. They have one mission, "to maintain peace," and one objective, "deterrence."

In the field, Mauroy witnessed live-firing demonstrations of HOT, Milan, and Pluton missiles, plus tank maneuvers, in which troops displayed a combination of technical know-how and maneuverability, a technical know-how and maneuverability demonstrated equally by career soldiers and draftees, the latter actually being operationally ready after 7 to 8 months of active duty.

Is a modern army incompatible with a 6-month term of compulsory military service? Even though many experts openly claim it is, the prime minister continues to support a 6-month term of service for draftees, but by qualifying this support more than ever. "We are not giving up the principle of 6 months service, but to adopt that term we would have to be in a different international environment. Above all, an abrupt change from the present term to one of 6 months is out of the question. Gradualism is called for. This will require both time and favorable circumstances."

And circumstances are far from favorable in many regions. To such a point that Pierre Mauroy did not hold back when referring to East-West relations and the basing of American Pershing missiles in Europe: "France insists on the balance of forces. That balance must be restored so that there can be more effective discussion. And our deterrence is comprehensive."

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CSO: 3100/648

MILITARY

FRANCE

BRIEFS

MIRAGE 2000's FOR CHINA--After having refused to do so for 4 years, the French Government has now agreed to send a fact-finding mission to the People's Republic of China to discuss the sale of Mirage 2000 aircraft to that country. This delegation is expected to depart shortly. [Text] [Paris AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL in French 1-14 May 82 p 15] 8041

CSO: 3100/648

OFFICERS ORGANIZATIONS PROTEST NEW COMMAND SYSTEM PROPOSAL

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 7 May 82 p 2

[Report by Harald Stanghelle]

[Text] Norwegian officers are protesting against the Armed Forces leadership and the political leadership in the Ministry of Defense.

At national meetings of the two biggest junior officers' and noncommissioned officers' organizations within the Confederation of Officers' Organizations it has been determined that "a serious disagreement has arisen between the main body of the Army's junior officers and noncommissioned officers and the Army's leadership." Furthermore, it is emphasized that there is a "strained relationship between the junior officers and non-commissioned officers and the political leadership of the Ministry of Defense."

Together the two officers' organizations represent over 4,000 of the Army's 6,000 officers. And the cause of this unusually sharp tone on the junior officers' and noncommissioned officers' side is the proposal for a new command system. The criticism is especially directed against the new training model that the political leadership of the Ministry of Defense has proposed.

The officers' organizations assert that the junior officers and noncommissioned officers cannot accept the proposal, and say that it is in conflict with the conditions set by the Storting.

Confidence Gap

"A confidence gap is developing between the Armed Forces leadership and large numbers of the Army's junior officers and noncommissioned officers. This is very serious, and greatly to the detriment of the Armed Forces," the officers' organizations assert.

The Confederation of Officers' Organizations favors a number of concrete proposals aimed at strengthening command training. It is pointed out that recruitments for the officers' corps have dropped catastrophically in recent years. The situation is so serious that the quotas are not filled at certain levels of the command schools. The number of student places has increased, but it is

found to be impossible to fill the quotas. Among other things, recruiting for the upper level of the Command School has dropped by 30 percent in the last 2 years.

The Armed Forces leadership has presented a proposal to attempt to remedy this, but the Confederation of Officers' Organizations is by no means pleased with it.

"The proposal by the Armed Forces leadership, on the contrary, means a weakening of command training compared with the present arrangement," the officers assert.

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CSO: 3108/104

POLL SHOWS STRONG SUPPORT FOR U.S. EXERCISES IN COUNTRY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 15 May 82 p 3

[Text] American soldiers should be allowed to take part in exercises in Norway. The majority is clear in the week's poll: 66 percent say yes; only 14 percent want to exclude American soldiers from NATO exercises on Norwegian soil. Opinions are greatly divided on the question of whether the Norwegians should denounce or not interfere at all in U.S. policy in regard to El Salvador--which was the background for the debate here in Norway about American soldiers' participation in NATO exercises in Norway.

Norwegian Market Data carried out this survey in March-April by personal interviews with 1,400 women and men over 15 years of age. The week's poll shows clearly that even though there are divided opinions on the question whether Norway should get involved in the El Salvador policy of the United States, it is a vanishingly small part that think Norway should support the U.S. line.

The question ran: "Do you think that Norway should officially denounce U.S. policy toward El Salvador, or do you think Norway should support that policy, or do you think that Norway should not get involved in it, or are you in doubt about it?"

	All Those Questioned %	Political Sympathy*					
		A %	SV %	H %	KrF %	S %	V %
Should denounce it	39	45	84	22	27	30	47
Should support it	4	2	1	6	3	1	7
Not get involved	31	28	7	42	28	36	22
Doubt/Do not know enough about it	26	25	8	30	42	33	24
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

*A = Labor Party; SV = Socialist Left Party; H = Conservative Party; KrF = Christian People's Party; S = Center Party; V = Liberal Party.

Of all those questioned, 39 percent say that Norway should denounce the U.S. policy toward El Salvador, while only 4 percent say we should support it. The rest either say we should not get involved in that policy or are in doubt about what Norway should do. But, as the table shows, there are great differences in opinion depending on the political sympathy of those interviewed. Among persons who vote for the Socialist Left Party there are a very clear majority that think we should denounce U.S. policy toward El Salvador. Among the Labor Party's and the Liberal Party's voters, too, there are relatively many who share this view. Other sorts also show that this view is more widespread among younger than among older persons.

"Do you think that American NATO troops should be denied the right to take part in allied military exercises in Northern Norway or that they should get to take part?"

	All Those Questioned %	Political Sympathy					
		A %	SV %	H %	KrF %	S %	V %
Should be denied right to take part	14	15	51	4	6	6	20
Should be allowed to take part	66	65	25	83	67	77	56
Do not know	20	20	24	13	27	17	24
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Only 14 percent of those questioned feel that American NATO troops should be denied the right to take part in military exercises in Northern Norway. Among the SV voters there are a majority that support that idea. In the other parties there are a clear majority who think that the United States should take part in such exercises.

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END